


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West Europe Report



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11 JUNE 1986

WEST EUROPE REPORT

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POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

FRG LAENDER SEEKS TO PROTECT OWN INTERESTS AT EC HEADQUARTERS

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 5 May 86 pp 48-50

[Unattributed article: "The Right Way--FRG Laender Think They Are Poorly Represented in Brussels-- Two Laender Have Already Opened Their Own Bureaus"]

[Text] Bonn's minister for economics, Martin Bangemann, thinks the trend is "scandalous." The Bonn minister of state in charge of European affairs, Lutz Stavenhagen, has "doubts that this is the right way." And Foreign Minister officials already fear for their office's exclusive claim to representation abroad.

The Federal Government is viewing with suspicion the recently aroused interest of FRG Leader in Europe and their push to open branches of their own with the EC in Brussels. After Hamburg had already established a presence of its own in the Belgian capital with its "Hansa Bureau," and the Saarland having done likewise with a bureau of information, now North Rhine-Westphalia too, according to the head of Chancery in Duesseldorf, Klaus Dieter Leister, has discovered EC Headquarters as "an economically and politically important spot." The Duesseldorf Land government is going to open a liaison office in Brussels as early as this summer.

Baden-Wuerttemberg, Hesse, and Bavaria also want to send their own representatives to the headquarters of the EC Commission. They not only long for the money facets of the over 200 Community funds and projects in order to "milk the Europe cow," as Saarland Europe representative Ottokar puts it; (they believe) that in the past few years their regional needs have too often gone unheeded in the European Community.

The Land politicians criticize the Federal Government for always looking only at the total picture, despite the fact that the interests of their Laender surely should carry at least as much weight as those of EC member Luxembourg, which can make its wishes known at the negotiating table.

Moreover, others too are represented by observers and lobbyists. U.S. states such as Ohio maintain offices in Brussels, the "Cassa per il mezzogiorno" lobbies in behalf of the poor Italian south, Scotland is represented by a bureau, and the declining British industrial regions of Glasgow, Manchester, and Liverpool have "liason officers." Indeed the regions are interested not

so much in better PR, champagne receptions, and expense account budgets for trips to Brussels as in being listened to or even being allowed to have a say at the European government headquarters.

Thus Bavaria's Franz Josef Strauss recently, in a letter to Chancellor Kohl, warned that the prevailing "high German standard" in the public health, working conditions, and protection of the environment "will be reduced to the overall lower European level" by the implementation of a uniform domestic market within the EC boundaries.

For the sake of "short-term foreign policy successes," he states, the German head of government has played down "domestic policy considerations" in Brussels. About 300 regulations and guidelines are to be adjusted in the European member countries by 1992 without the Federal Government knowing as yet "what the effect will be on the powers of the Laender."

In a draft resolution submitted to the Bundesrat [FRG upper house] the Bavarian Land government is proposing an amendment of the Basic Law. It states that it is no longer acceptable for the policy of European integration to be a monopoly of the Federal Government, as laid down in paragraph 32. Rather, the Laender must be "conceded the right to appropriately participate in decisions." The SPD-ruled FRG Laender have joined the Bavarian action.

The concern of the Laevender lest they lose rights and opportunities of influence in the course of European agreement (which is proceeding quite slowly as it is) "being taken very seriously by us," states Foreign Ministry's State Minister Stavenhagen. But the Foreign Ministry does not want the Federal responsibility for Europe policy to be infringed.

Aroused by the Laender competition, Bonn Foreign Ministry personnel, in a confidential paper about the "added foreign policy of the Laender", lists a number of sins, claiming that the manifold political, economic, and cultural activities of Laender or municipalities are splitting the Federal responsibility for foreign affairs.

They regard as particularly reprehensible the "increasing travel activity" of minister-presidents and Land politicians, of which the appropriate authorities are "often informed only through applications for personal protection."

Genscher's diplomats conducted a count: Baden-Wuerttemberg's Minister-President Lothar Spaeth and his ministers have taken 56 trips around the globe in behalf of industrial products wrought by Swabian industriousness. A saying at the Foreign Ministry: "What is the difference between God and Lothar Spaeth? God is everywhere; Spaeth has been everywhere."

Slightly behind, Bavarian Land politicians are in second place with 47 performances abroad since 1981--despite the itch for travel of their chief, Franz Josef Strauss, whose limousine displayed the Bavarian standard during a visit to Damascus shortly before Easter.

Berlin travelers, with 39 trips, were allotted 3d place by the Foreign Ministry researchers. In all, according to the summary issued by Genscher's ministry, provincial political tourism has risen 250 percent in the past 5 years.

Embaasies, particularly in Washington, Beijing, and Tokyo, have a hard time coping with the stream of visitors. "We are no travel agency, are we?" complains a Bonn diplomat in Washington. Some hosts are getting tired of the invasion from German lands, and the U.S. Government now refuses to make appointments for meetings or even photo sessions for Land emissaries. "Surely we cannot brief every German Lord mayor on disarmament," says a U.S. diplomat.

The EC Commission, on the other hand, is pleased to see the push of the Laender toward Brussels. After all, says Commission spokesman Hugo Paemen, the FRG is a federal state, "and it is good for us to become more familiar with regional interests."

A foreign policy of the Laender in direct competition with the foreign ministry has its tradition. As early as 1979, Johannes Rau, at the time chairman of the Minister-President's Conference, warned Chancellor Helmut Schmidt that the Laender were participating insufficiently in European decisions.

Schmidt promised "close and trusting cooperation." At that time, the "Laender observer" at the EC was given a few more responsibilities. The officer, who has an office at the Baden-Wuerttemberg Land Representation in Bonn, was given a foreign office not far from the Commission in Brussels. Since then he has been able to attend all Council sessions as a silent observer and also to distribute minutes and reports to the Laender.

The Laender now hope to get much more from a lobbyist of their own than they have been getting from an EC observer acting on behalf of all of them; Hamburg already has one, what with former Brussels EC Commissioner Wilhem Haferkamp specifically seeking subsidies for Hamburg shipyards or Hamburg contacts with the more than 400 industrial organizations and company representations in Brussels.

To the Saarlanders, in turn, the steel and coal projects of the Community are important. At seminars Ottokar Hahn and his Brussels assistant Claus-Michael Falkenberg inform Saarland businessmen about EC raw materials and ecological projects.

So far all are anxious to keep their branches from getting into conflict with the Foreign Ministry. State Secretary Leister says: "We want to cooperate, not compete." With emphatic modesty, Haferkamp and Hahn established themselves not as representations of the Laender but as information bureaus. Emphatically modest, too, is Haferkamp's compensation: DM 1 per month--however, plus expenses.

8790/13068
CSO: 3600/686

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

COALITION DIVIDED ON ISSUES CONNECTED WITH ASYLUM SEEKERS

Bonn RHEINISCHER MERKUR/CHRIST UND WELT in German 19 Apr 86 p 2

[Article by Heinz-Joachim Melder: "The Liberals are Standing on the Brakes"]

[Text] The endless and painful discussions about the right of asylum are among the least edifying elements of Bonn coalition politics. Even those involved sometimes bemoan the irrational character of the wrangling and speak of "pseudo-discussions." Accordingly, it is nearly a matter of sheer political coincidence whether by the end of this legislative session an amendment to the law on the asylum procedure will be on the books, and what its contents will be. The Laender governed by the CDU and the CSU have been pushing for such a law since the end of 1984.

The initiative in pressing for modernized legal correctives to the procedures for granting asylum and for changes in related measures originates in the noticeable increase in the number of applicants within the last three years. While after the restrictive decrees of the Federal Diet in 1982 only 19,773 foreigners in the FRG applied for asylum, since then the number has risen again to 73, 832.

It is this trend, above all, which is disturbing politicians on the federal, state and local level who are concerned with questions of asylum. The Laender are finding it harder and harder to apportion asylum seekers among the individual communities in accordance with the distribution scheme. There is also resistance in communities with large holding camps. It is equally impossible to ignore the complaints of the communities that they can no longer raise the costs of social assistance for asylum seekers and that the federal treasury must intervene.

The difficulties faced by Laender and communities are not denied in Bonn. But the search for a solution is causing the coalition mechanism to creak at the joints. Even the Christian Democrats in the Bonn government, unlike their colleagues in the Laender, are not fully convinced that altering the legal and material requirements for asylum seekers or streamlining the procedure will make it possible to end the alleged abuse of the right of asylum and cause a significant and permanent reduction in the high number of applicants. In contrast, the initiative of the Federal Diet requests:

--extension of the ban on working until final granting of asylum status, previously limited to two years, and extension of this limitation to certain groups of applicants from the Eastern bloc;

--regular examination of those already granted asylum as to the continued existence of grounds for asylum;

--accommodations limited to holding camps.

In the Federal Government there is skepticism as to whether illegitimate asylum-seekers could really be "deterred" by such changes, and the FDP regards such a deterrent effect as exaggerated in any case. The additional examinations are also considered to be scarcely practicable.

Federal Interior Minister Zimmermann (CSU) sees the position in more drastic terms. He considers that the planned amendment is mere window-dressing. The Red Army of the Soviet Union, to cite his favorite example, wouldn't need to invade the FRG. All they would have to do is say the magic word "Asylum" at the border. Zimmermann would prefer to see a limitation in the basic right to asylum, as it is established in Article 16 of the constitution. He claims that the formulation "Victims of political persecution enjoy the right of asylum" is too absolutely stated and requires elaboration, explanation and expansion in order to be applicable today.

There used to be some in the SPD, too, who believed that the constitutional article needed to be complemented by a legal proviso. But because there is no realistic chance for a majority in favor of such a change in the constitution, even Zimmermann avoids demanding it publicly. So the only possible reactions to new developments are still alterations in the current asylum procedure.

These are hard enough to implement in themselves. The FDP in particular stands in the way. FDP legal politicians Hirsch and Baum have frequently stated that the right of asylum is so sacred that even extensive abuse is not a basis for harsh limitations. But along with liberal conviction, this may have something to do with the fact that the FDP has no need to pay any attention to Cabinet heads or mayors, since it is not putting forward any for office.

From the first announcement of an amendment to the law of asylum in 1984 until today the complete inability of the coalition partners to speak reasonably about the basic questions has been revealed. It is true that their verbal forays into realms of imagination are outdone by those of certain social groups, although the legal proposals are much less significant than earlier changes to the law of asylum.

And yet no one in the political parties has ever seriously analysed what political persecution in the sense of the constitution really means today. Such a discussion would neither have limited nor devalued that constitution, much less have and any legal relevance or binding effect. But it would have given them an opportunity to achieve some clarity on the question of whether a broadening misuse of the right of asylum is not devaluing and endangering the constitution.

Unfortunately, "knock-out" arguments prevail among the coalition parties of CDU/CSU and FDP, for whom deep mistrust in internal matters and questions of security is often stronger than the desire for partnership and cooperation. Anyone who even worries about the high number of foreigners is liable to a charge of "racist thinking." Anyone who tackles the topic of the difficulties which parts of the German population have with members of foreign cultural groups is not infrequently suspected of inciting vapid nationalism. On the other hand, none of the keepers of the Holy Grail of a liberal granting of asylum is ready to declare that the FRG is a land open to immigration, although that is precisely the way the trend is going. But an open discussion of this question, without witch-hunting, is a necessary condition for a rational policy on asylum and foreigners.

It is no wonder if under such conditions the amendment to the law on asylum procedure is passing sluggishly through advisory channels. There has not even been a constitutional debate about whether an amendment is necessary at all. For even as it is, approximately three-quarters of the asylum seekers who are turned down are permitted to remain in the FRG on humanitarian grounds and are not deported. In addition, it would be best to consider whether legislative coldness towards asylum seekers is appropriate when the integration of millions of foreigners has to a large degree already succeeded.

When at the beginning of 1985 the legal amendment was introduced into the legislative process, it was met at first by an extremely critical and aloof "counter-statement" by the Federal Government. The demand for regular examination of those who have been granted asylum to establish the continued existence of grounds for granting was rejected in July of 1985. The Federal Government argued that it was already possible to rescind the granting of asylum if the conditions in the country of origin had changed and the grounds for persecution no longer existed. Such changes, however, were extremely rare and thus did not justify any routine and expensive official examination.

Nor did the Federal Government consider than an extension of the waiting period until asylum had been granted was reasonable. The Federal Government gave as its reason for rejection that it could be assumed that asylum seekers who already accept a two-year waiting period would continue to wait even longer for a work permit in the FRG as long as support was still assured through social welfare services. Less radical desires of the Laender for the legal establishment of reasons for denying asylum did not find a sympathetic ear in the Federal Government, which did not want to "stir up any political dust." The only suggestions to be accepted were expedition of the procedure and staff increases.

After protracted coalition discussions, the Federal Government finally declared itself ready in 1985 to introduce a waiting period before granting work permits even for asylum seekers from East Bloc states, but in other regards remained adamant.

Meanwhile, the Liberals have rediscovered their reluctance to accept any change in the law. They have even raised the question of more favorable conditions for aslyum seekers, and are demanding a total ban on deportation to the homeland until the completion of the asylum-granting process, even if criminal offenses are involved.

In March a new round of inquiries within the coalition began, which practically again begins in the same place where it was in 1984. Again the partners have declared that they want to reach decisions "promptly," but there are few left who believe that.

9337/9835

CSO: 3620/661

POLITICAL

FRANCE

PERSONNEL CHANGES IN SECURITY SERVICES NOTED

Paris LIBERATION in French 28 Apr 86 p 16

[Article by Georges Marion: "Purges at the Ministry of the Interior:"]

[Text] Three commissioners from CRS [Republican Security Companies] headquarters have just been "laid off": since 17 March, a witch-hunt has been in full force among the cops. A first wave, a "political" one, affected the directors of the active police force. The lower ranks are settling scores.

Who said, speaking of the police: "There was an idiotic and unjust witch-hunt?" Answer: Robert Pandraud, minister assigned to security. He said it in January 1986, in an interview published by LUI when he was only Jacques Chirac's cabinet director, and the latter only mayor of Paris. The witch-hunt was the one being carried on by the Left. Since then, the cabinet director has risen in rank, and now that he has become a minister, seems to have forgotten his erstwhile indignation. Three CRS commissioners have just learned the fact at their expense: on 21 April they received a letter of dismissal. The reason: "The definition of a new employment and operating policy for the Republican Security Companies requires that the positions occupied by those concerned be held by officials newly appointed to the central service." One could hardly be clearer.

This brusque letter aroused strong reactions among the CRS cadres who do not always have a reputation for diplomatic finesse or their tactical sense. Was it because of this uproar that Robert Pandraud, who was to come to appoint division commissioner Jacques Breniere to his position as the new head of the CRS central service, decided to postpone the ceremony? However that may be, the malicious rumors of a witch-hunt have begun to circulate in the Ministry of the Interior. And apparently, it is still not simply a bad dream.

Since 17 March two waves of purges of different kinds have swept the ministry. The first, which may be called a "political" one, affected the directors of the active services of which several representatives have had to leave their jobs. Strictly speaking, it came as no surprise: on that level, rightly or wrongly, one generally expects changes to take place in connection with election returns.

Among those included in this batch: Remy Pautrat, director of the DST [Directorate of Territorial Surveillance], replaced by Bernard Gerard; Jean-Paul

Clerc, director of the IGP [not further identified], whose successor is Marcel Leclerc and is at present without assignment; Jean-Jacques Pascal, director of personnel and police training; Serge Gondel, head of the CRS central service, replaced on 21 April by Jacques Breniere; Gerard Deplace, central director of public security, who was ousted at the last council of ministers meeting; Gerard Maurel, director of public security at Police Headquarters, whose successor has not yet been appointed; Bruno Genevoix (Footnote 1) (Bruno Benevoix was appointed to this position in June 1985, and not last February as we stated in our issue of 24 April), director of public liberties (the former administration of regulations). In less than 6 weeks, half the inspector of active police positions, made up of the Ministry of the Interior and Police Headquarters combined, had changed personnel. Quite some changes under Chirac.

And that is to continue. At the very least, the following are also targeted: Pierre Verbrugghe, managing director of the national police, and Pierre Chassigneux, central director of the RG [General Intelligence Office], from which two close colleagues, Division Commissioner Fulvio Raggi and Inspector General Jean-Paul Ricquois, have just been removed. Pierre Chassigneux was quickly replaced by Philippe Massoni, the present assistant director in Robert Pandraud's cabinet.

All of them are paying for various "sins," not always in the strictly political domain: Remy Pautrat, Serge Gondel, and Gerard Deplace are considered close to the Socialists; Jean-Paul Clerc, who is by no means a leftwinger, is above all a personal friend of Paul Roux (himself a former director of the RG and the IGP, a confirmed socialist, and recently removed from his position as prefect); Pierre Chassigneux, former prefect of Nièvre, is suspected of being too loyal to Mitterrand, and Gerard Maurel is regarded as being too close to Pierre Joxe. Pierre Verbrugghe's case, the paradoxical friend of Robert Pandraud, seems more complex: his head was already destined for the ax when the refusal of the president of the republic to sign the transfer of a man whom he holds in particular esteem brought a reprieve. But there is no guarantee that he will survive the next attempt.

Special mention should be made of Prefect Robert Broussard, head of the RAID, the police equivalent of the GIGN [National Gendarmerie Intervention Group]. In principal, nothing should threaten the safety of his future...except that Pandraud cares little for him, and Raymond Sasia not at all. The latter is close to Pasqua and is currently the powerful security chief at the Ministry of the Interior. In these terms, Broussard's case is not so much a matter of a witch-hunt than of a struggle between those animals said to be incapable of sharing the same habitat.

The second wave of purges at the Ministry of the Interior affected, not the directorial levels this time, but that immediately below them, that of the commissioners, and indeed sometimes the inspectors. The dismissals were carried out more discreetly there, but were far more indicative of a desire for revenge.

A characteristic anecdote: Division Commissioner Jean-Louis Garrigues, head of the Official Trips Department (the VO's) under Giscard and currently posted to

the IGPN has just lodged a charming request with Charles Pasqua. He is asking for nothing less than the cancellation of all appointments to the position of general controller made under the Left and--this is understood--the appointment in their place of other beneficiaries. Including himself, obviously.

In the "minor witch" category are included the three ousted from CRS headquarters, Principal Commissioner Pierre Lesage, Commissioner Guy Pargemin, and Commissioner Jean-Pierre Gruwez. Not one of these men who have been shown the door could in any sense be said to be a Socialist sympathizer. But without making any bones about it, all three have served under the orders of Serge Gondel (see above). Just as have the 3 or 4 group leaders (out of 10), moreover, who are said to be threatened.

All of them, as the "letter of dismissal" referred to above makes plain, may have some reservations concerning this "new CRS employment and operating policy," not further defined, alluded to by the new CRS chief. It may be pointed out that the latter arrived with Commandant Wey tagging along, an officer with quite a reputation in the organization. A few years ago, to make the experience more authentic, the latter used to train his men by heaving offensive grenades at their feet. One of the guards lost an eye, and Commandant Wey was reassigned to other responsibilities. Fortunately, in the headquarters where he has been placed, he will only be handling pens.

Other recent departures, in the literal as well as figurative sense, include RG [General Intelligence] Commissioner Jean-Claude Corteel, Principal Commissioner Jean-Louis Milhou from the DST, Principal Commissioner Pierre Vaillier, and PAF [Air and Border Police] Division Inspector Michel Veux. All four had been posted to New Caledonia and have just been recalled from there. The friends of Pons, the new minister of the DOM-TOM [Overseas Departments and Territories], finally got them. Not because these officials favored the Kanak separatists, but because their task of surveillance, including the use of wiretaps, applied also to the extremists of the RPCR [Rally for Caledonia in the Republic] and the National Front, and this was an unusual practice on the island.

Except among the CRS where organizational solidarity has always been very strong, all these evictions do not seem to have stirred up much of a reaction from the Commissioners Association (80 percent of those in the profession).

Last Thursday, a meeting of the union's administrative authorities barely mentioned the problem. The next day, Robert Pandraud, during an information meeting held with the administrations of the police associations, announced the future appointments of "some friends," including that of Robert Naud, secretary general of the Commissioners Association. The latter will shortly be appointed director of technical services for Police Headquarters.

9824

CSO: 3519/164

POLITICAL

NETHERLANDS

STATUS, OUTSIDE TIES OF MUSLIM MINORITY VIEWED

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 26 Apr 86 p 2

[Report on interview with the Reverend Jan Slomp, by spiritual life editor Frits Groeneveld: "'Netherlands Has Little to Fear From Islam'--Muslims Fare Better Here Than Christians in Islamic Countries"]

[Text] Leusden, 26 April--"The Netherlands has very little to fear on the part of Islam. There are few or no Libyan Muslims here; they don't play any statistical role. And there are not many Khomeini followers in the Netherlands either. I know a few of them, but their number does not compare to that in the Federal Republic of Germany. There they have established a large center in Hamburg; on their reading table there were anti-American and anti-zionist publications."

These comforting statements come from the 54-year old reformed minister Jan Slomp. From the reformed service center in Leusden, he travels all over the world to educate on the getting together of Christians and Muslims. He says that gives him more than a full-time job: his agenda includes numerous speeches to raise understanding for Islam. Furthermore, he is the secretary of the advisory committee of the conference of European churches on Islam and the Muslims in Europe.

Minister Slomp worked for 13 years as a reformed mission preacher in Pakistan, and he says that there he realized how essential a continuous dialogue between Muslims and Christians really is. In the Netherlands the number of Muslims continues to increase; Islam with currently about 310,000 adherents went through an explosive growth here. Slomp expects a hefty increase in that number in the coming years.

The earliest mosque in the Netherlands is located in the Frisian community of Balk. It was established there in the fifties by former KNIL [Royal Dutch-Indian Army] who adhered to the Muslim faith. Their number has enormously increased since that time, primarily because of the arrival of Muslim "guest workers" from Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey and Yugoslavia: of the 310,000 Muslims in the Netherlands, almost 90 percent come from the Mediterranean Sea area, the others primarily from Indonesia and Surinam. They represent various Muslim schools dating back to the middle ages. For example, the majority of the Turkish Muslims are Sunnites, the Indonesian ones are Shafi'ites, the

Surinamese and Pakistani Muslims are mainly Hanafites, and the Moroccan ones are Malakites.

Also Shi'ites, who are in power in Iran and Syria, are present in the Netherlands, but according to Slomp they are very moderate in their behavior here. In Jewish circles in the Netherlands a different opinion is held in that regard. Reference is made to the statements of the founder of the Shi'ite "Hussein Mission," Mr Rizvi, in the NIEUWE REVU of 7 February. Mr. Rizvi pictured the Jews as "the cause of all problems, for if you give the Jews a small place in society, they expand it within the shortest possible time. Since the time of Moses the Jews have destroyed people; it's in their blood." According to the Center for Information and Documentation on Israel (CIDI) in The Hague, one of the causes of such statements may lie in the contacts some Dutch-Islamic groups have with Libya and other Arabic countries, and the financial support coupled to that. In the CIDI, one further doesn't believe at all the announcement by the Department of Foreign Affairs that only about 10 Libyans live in the Netherlands. "Simply ridiculous," according to CIDI director R. Naftaniel.

According to the interchurch paper "BEGRIIP" [Understanding] (on relations between Muslims and Christians), it is primarily the fact that the fairly small number of Shi'ites in the Netherlands is spread over various Shi'ite currents hampers the coming into being of viable Shi'ite organizations. Only in The Hague there is a Shi'ite center, the Alawite mosque. Slomp further points out that Muslim fanaticism occurs not only among Shi'ites. The extremism or fascism of Islam exists among all Muslims in his view, "but we are not bothered much by it here."

Furthermore, he is happy to find that in the Netherlands, where the Muslims represent the second religion, there is much tolerance toward them. "It is better for a Muslim to live here than for a Christian to live in an Islamic country," is his firm opinion. He says that within the churches there are fewer and fewer people who see Islam as a "false religion," as a religion which is the great rival of Christianity and forms a threat to the church and to society. He immediately adds that tolerance in the Netherlands is primarily due to indifference and that, if Muslims and autochthonous Netherlands get under each other's skin, the tolerance rapidly decreases. That happens in spite of the fact that Muslims--of course also out of self-interest--do their very best to be as friendly as possible to non-Muslims.

The tolerance in the Netherlands is also apparent from the attitude of the government, according to Slomp. For example, Minister Brinkman (WVC [Welfare, Health and Culture]) last week granted a broadcasting authorization to the Islamic Broadcasting Foundation (IOS) for 13 hours of television and 50 hours of radio time annually, approximately the same as allocated to the Humanistic Alliance. The clergyman finds that a very generous offer--"certainly if you remember that Christians in an Islamic country such as Algeria are allowed to appear on television very briefly only at Christmas and Easter."

Slomp has fearful premonitions, however, as to the level of the imminent broadcasts of the IOS, primarily because he thinks that Muslims are

barely capable of separating propaganda and information. "If the Islamic broadcasting system is going to present Islam as the only true religion, it will rapidly become offensive to the public at large," he expects.

The Muslims and their organizations receive support not only from the Dutch Government, as became obvious at the beginning of March when the ministers of Welfare and Culture and of Home Affairs (according to Slomp "as an election stunt") voted 400,000 guilders for cultural and religious Muslim activities, but also from abroad. For example, the Muslim World League, based in Jeddah (Saudi Arabia), supplied aid in 1975 upon the foundation of a federation of Muslim organizations in the Netherlands, and in January 1985 the representative of Saudi Arabia came with an additional gift of 10,000 dollars upon the opening of the Taibah mosque in the Amsterdam Bijlmermeer district. Immediately thereafter, the Libyan representative offered double that amount.

Slomp says he does not know exactly how much support the Muslims in the Netherlands receive from abroad. There is secrecy in this regard, but it is clearly part of the policy of Islamic countries and organizations to continually offer a helping hand to their brothers abroad who themselves also make large financial sacrifices for their religious community. For example, the International Association for the Call to Islam, based in Tripoli, paid for a big Islamic congress in the Utrecht Exhibition Hall. "I was a guest speaker there," says Slomp. "All the walls were full with statements by Gaddafi; we really were all a little amused by that."

So far about 200 mosques and prayer places now exist in the Netherlands. That is a considerably greater number than the Christian churches, not even to mention synagogues, that can be found in strict Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia or Afghanistan where other religions are officially prohibited and forcefully resisted. "I must say that tolerance toward Christians in Muslim countries is in a poor state," the reverend Slomp laments. "Islam prohibits conversion to another religion. In Egypt not long ago, a few Muslims who had become Christians were thrown into prison." The intermediary between Christianity and Islam says he understands very well that in the Netherlands there is fear among some people for the revival and expansion of Islam. "But the fear harbored by Muslims in the Middle East for the West, especially for the United States, is many times greater. There is a well-founded reason for that, in view of the American manner of acting in Iran at the time, and now again in Libya. Also the manner in which the American media--with their great influence in Europe--continually put Islam in a bad light, makes it understandable that the Muslims think there is great danger to be feared from the West.

As to the Dutch society, Slomp believes that the degree of acceptance of Islam ought to increase, and that the government should continue to subsidize the construction of mosques. Not only because many of them are in a deplorable condition, but also because with such a subsidy policy the government "can counter the taking root of undesired extreme influences from abroad" and "can prevent a type of ghetto mentality from dominating the Muslims in the Netherlands." In this context he also thinks of Muslim youths who, when they become frustrated because of not being able to gain acceptance in society, could turn to the radical, fundamentalist currents in Islam.

Now it is primarily a matter of achieving unity in the Muslim minority in the Netherlands, he says. "That can only come about when the Surinamese, Moroccan, Turkish and Pakistani Muslims among us start listening to each other rather than to their prompters in Tripoli, Ankara. Rabat or Jeddah."

8700

CSO: 3614/102

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

KARIN SODER ON CENTER PARTY'S PROBLEMS, GOALS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 8 Apr 86 p 8

[Article by Magdalena Ribbing]

[Text] The Center Party has been through a rough period, but now things are getting easier. That is how Karin Soder sums up the present situation in her party. She will soon decide whether she wants to become the Center Party's new leader, as so many of her fellow party members want her to do. It sounds as if she is on the way to shouldering the burden after all.

The Center Party Executive Council held a meeting in the Parliament Building on Monday. The meeting, held in the chamber used by the former Lower House, was attended by 150 delegates from the Center Party's 29 party districts.

Delighted applause was heard from inside the hall when Karin Soder told a funny story. She herself stepped outside for a while and talked about optimism and the go-ahead spirit. The executive council discussed organizational matters.

No big changes are in the works, but this marks the kickoff for getting priorities straight and finding the right relationships, Karin Soder said.

She did not want to talk about her upcoming decision to accept--or reject--the party leadership. But conscientious Karin Soder admits that she is driven by what she feels it is her duty to do. And in this case, that would mean saying yes to the chairmanship of the Center Party.

She said: "I have realized for a long time that the majority is favorable to my candidacy, but I feel that that is a response to the hard work that Olof Johansson and I have done since we took over at the beginning of December."

Uncertain Soder

For Karin Soder, the uncertainty over whether to accept the job as chairwoman is due to the lack of freedom that acceptance would bring and the fact that she would have to say no to other tasks in which she is heavily involved, examples being Nordic issues and the Save the Children organization.

"It is important to take criticism seriously," said Karin Soder with reference to the Center Party's investigation of its crisis. "Every popular movement gains from analyzing its organization and its shortcomings. And it is natural," she said, "that there should be criticism when a party declines."

Karin Soder elegantly avoided answering the question of whether the current climate of debate differs from that which existed last fall, when Thorbjorn Falldin was still at the head of the Center Party. She would say only that after last fall's election, the Center Party was in a crisis situation and every responsible member of the party was asking what could be done about it.

But Andreas Carlgren, chairman of the Youth League, says unreservedly that there is a lighter atmosphere now--it is possible to talk and discuss. He also feels that there is a go-ahead spirit in the party now. "The election defeat was so great that we could no longer duck the problem," he says.

"Straight Talk"

"The organizational plans are going to work well; people will know what the Center Party stands for. That is something they hardly knew before. But we will not be kicking up our heels--there will not be rapid growth."

Andreas Carlgren wants "straight talk, simple messages, and new blood" on the party board. And he believes there will be cooperation between Karin Soder and Olof Johansson despite reports to the contrary.

Concerning the willingness of Center Party representatives to talk about their party colleagues, Andreas Carlgren says that there has been altogether too much "crap and gossip" in the Center Party.

Party secretary Sven Thorstensson believes with 99-percent certainty, as he puts it, that Karin Soder will be the new chairwoman.

And Anders Ljunggren, the party's information chief, says that the party is indeed influenced by public opinion surveys--such as the most recent one, in which Karin Soder was shown to enjoy great credibility with the voters.

The current party board will immediately begin moving ahead quickly with the organizational matters decided on by the executive council, and the new party board will continue to do the same. There will be more conferences, with questions and discussion, out in the party's local sections.

But Karin Soder says firmly that there is currently no support for the proposal to start holding Center Party congresses every 2 or 3 years instead of annually.

11798

CSO: 3650/184

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

NEW ACTION TO PREVENT SALE OF TECHNOLOGY TO SOUTH AFRICA

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 20 Apr 86 p 8

[Text] (TT)--The government is tightening up the law on South Africa. The sale of technical know-how is being banned, and the monitoring of trade by Swedish firms with South Africa is being stepped up.

Minister of Trade Mats Hellstrom told the TT [PRESS WIRE SERVICE, INC.]: "Swedish firms are being given the spring months in which to show their good will. If there is no drop in trade with South Africa, we will scrutinize each firm's trade with that country."

Hellstrom announced the tightening up at the annual meeting of the Stockholm section of the Social Democratic Party on Saturday.

Until now it has been completely lawful to sell Swedish technical know-how and patents to South African firms despite the ban on investments.

Entire Industries

This means that it has been possible to set up entire industries in South Africa with Swedish help. As one example, Nobel Industries helped set up an explosives factory in the country.

Hellstrom says: "That is exactly the sort of thing we want to prevent in the future."

For just over a year, firms wanting to sell technical know-how to South Africa have been required to report each transaction. One such report was received last year--it was from Uddeholm, which wanted to participate in a project for the manufacture of pellets.

In October of last year, the government ordered Swedish firms which trade with South Africa to try to find other markets and suppliers. Since then, trade with South Africa has declined. In the last quarter of 1985, Swedish exports to that country fell by 48 percent, while imports fell by about 50 percent. And trade with South Africa declined further with the start of the new year, when imports of agricultural products were banned.

Not Satisfied

But Mats Hellstrom is still not satisfied. The reason is that since 1 January of this year, trade has not been declining as rapidly. Exports in January of this year were only 20 percent less than in January of last year.

Hellstrom says: "The government is going to monitor trade with South Africa very closely over the next few months. When the statistics are available in September, there will be a thorough examination of the way things have gone."

Licenses Introduced

If trade has not declined further by then, the government will introduce so-called supervisory licenses. This does not constitute a ban on trade with South Africa, but what it does mean is that each firm must report each transaction in minute detail.

Since last year, the government has had Parliament's permission to decree minor sanctions against South Africa without going to Parliament.

The ban on technology transfers may take effect within a couple of weeks.

11798

CSO: 3650/184

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

BRIEFS

REFUGEE QUOTA MAINTAINED--The refugee quota will remain at 1,250 persons next year. On Wednesday, Parliament rejected a bill by the VPK [Left Party-Communists] that would have increased the figure to 3,000. The quota has come nowhere near being filled in recent years, a circumstance for which the government was sharply criticized during the debate. The new and stiffer visa requirements were also attacked. [Text] [Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 3 Apr 86 p 6] 11798

ETHIOPIA CATASTROPHE AID --Acting on behalf of the government, Under Secretary of State Bengt Save-Soderbergh has signed two agreements on continued catastrophe aid for Ethiopia. The agreements, which were signed in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa, provide a total of 32 million kronor in catastrophe aid. [Text] [Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 3 Apr 86 p 6] 11798

CSO: 3650/185

POLITICAL

TURKEY

COLUMNIST VIEWS JOINT U.S. RELATIONS

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 3 Apr 86 p 10

[Commentary by Sami Kohen]

[Text] Forty years ago, when an American flotilla, which included the famous battleship "Missouri", anchored in the Bosphorous, the Turkish people welcomed the visitors with a rare enthusiasm and virtually embraced them.

In fact, the interest and enthusiasm shown to the American sailors initiated a new era in relations between the two nations.

The 'mobilization' of all the nightspots in Istanbul's Beyoglu quarter, the bars' welcoming the young visitors with signs reading "cold drinks and hot women", and the sailors' handing out chewing gum and American cigarettes to young people constituted only the superficial and entertaining aspect of the matter.

In actuality, this "friendship visit" had an important political significance. Turkey was under heavy pressure from Stalin's Russia, which had begun in Eastern Europe and was gradually expanding into neighboring areas, and which in this context had made demands pertaining to the Bosphorous and certain of our eastern provinces. Ankara was resisting Moscow's wishes, and even its threats. But our army and economy were very weak at the time.

The U.S., immediately after the Second World War, was very concerned over this Soviet expansionism. It perceived that Turkey numbered among the Soviets' targets. When President Truman sent the "Missouri" to Istanbul, he considered it to be a show of strength against Russia, and a signal for the Russians to desist. The "Missouri" was the start of a new era: Just a year after the visit, the Truman Doctrine would be implemented, Marshall aid to Turkey would begin, the U.S. would guarantee the security of Turkish territory against the Soviets, and, finally, the way for Turkish entry into NATO would be opened...

The "Missouri" visit is being commemorated this week with a conference being held by SISAV [Foundation for Political and Social Research]. A number of eminent Turkish and American diplomats and academicians have gathered to discuss "forty years of continuity and change" in Turkish-American relations.

There is no doubt that a great deal of water has passed under the bridge since the "Missouri" visit; there have been great changes in world politics, and Turkish-American relations have passed through various phases. A number of the realities and factors pertaining to that time are no longer relevant today. New conditions and concepts have taken their places.

Today, when one looks at the past forty years of the Turkish-American relationship, one sees that the initial period, in particular, provided great benefits for both sides. Certainly Washington was able to prevent Stalin's Russia from expanding into Turkish territory and even via the Bosphorous into the Mediterranean, and, through aid to Turkey, the U.S. was thus able to strengthen its global strategy and effectiveness. And Turkey, saved from falling a victim to Russian expansion, thereby enhanced its own security. Moreover, through the aid it began to receive, Turkey was also able to modernize its armed forces and develop its economy. It is worth noting that this assistance has totalled 12.8 billion dollars to date.

But international relations don't always proceed on the same steady course. Particularly in the period since 1960, Turkish-U.S. relations have followed an up-and-down course. President Johnson's all-too-well-known letter of 1964 and the arms embargo of 1975 marked the lowest points in the relationship. In those years, it became "undesirable" for the American fleet to anchor in the Bosphorous, and the American sailors whom the Turkish people had so embraced in 1946 were turned away from the waters off Dolmabahce.

It is necessary to examine why these relations, which have been normalized in recent years, have exhibited so many ups and downs in such a short time-period. Conclusions reached through objective analysis will certainly help to establish these relations on a sounder basis. If the SISAV conference can accomplish this, it will have made a significant contribution.

As noted above, much has changed, both in Turkey and in the wider world, since the visit of the "Missouri". This doesn't mean that Turkish U.S. relations have lost their previous usefulness. There are many reasons, and a great many mutual interests, favoring continued friendship and cooperation between the two countries. Since this is the basic point of departure, the question is then one as to how these relations can be sustained in a manner which will ensure steady mutual benefit.

A new realism is needed in Turkish-U.S. relations. Mere mutual understanding is insufficient. Last week when Schultz was in Turkey, he spoke for example of the "realities" of U.S. foreign trade. Turkish officials and businessmen explained Turkish "realities" to him. For both sides to comprehend these things is a good thing, but if things remain at this point the results will be nil. A new concept is called for. That is, it is necessary to get the relationship away from the basis of "aid in return for military bases" and broaden its base. And in order to accomplish this, much more serious and candid efforts, even forced efforts, are required...

Only in this way can we return to the "spirit of the 'Missouri'".

POLITICAL

TURKEY

COMMENTATOR TALKS ABOUT U.S. ARROGANCE

Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 3 Apr 86 p 3

[Commentary by Necati Zincirkiran]

[Text] It's really difficult to understand American policies. Just because we explained some of our desires in a very candid way to U.S. Secretary of State Schultz, our relations are practically at the breaking point.

And just look what Dr. Jed Snyder, one of the White House's advisors, had to say on this topic:

"A great mistake has been made. The negotiations shouldn't have been carried out openly, but privately and in secret. It was a great mistake to put the U.S. Secretary of State on the spot in public. I want to say that what was done was the worst thing possible. I talked with Schultz's advisors. They said that he was extremely angry, because he hadn't expected such behavior from Turkey. You expect such behavior only from allies in which you can't have confidence. This is a very unfortunate development."

When the Americans encounter behavior to which they're not accustomed, they react in this strange manner. It's because they look at the world in a different manner, from within a superiority complex.

They apply the philosophy that "We created the world; those in our camp are our subjects. Whatever we say, you're obliged to accept it. However much we give, you'll be satisfied with that."

Do subjects protest? Do they criticize? Just what does this mean?

Here is the real interpretation of the incident:

We've known them for 40 years. America has been in our midst for the past 40 years. We live on very intimate terms with them.

Until today, they've been accustomed to hearing "yes" all the time. They've undermined everyone who hasn't said "yes" to them all the time. If we cast a glance at recent history, at the drama of Menderes, at Inonu's fall from the position of Prime Minister, at Ecevit and even at Demirel, America has

always wanted to keep its subjects in a state of dependency. It neither kills them nor lets them really live.

America just lays down the law: "You'll only be as strong as I ordain."

The Schultz incident is but another proof of this.

We mustn't be taken in. We are on the right track in this issue. We're following a policy that has dignity. If we persevere, we'll prevail!

9173

CSO: 3554/39

POLITICAL

TURKEY

COMMENTARY VIEWS DISCORDANT RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 2 Apr 86 p 10

[Commentary by Ilhami Soysal]

[Text] Take a map of Turkey and cast a glance at our neighbors... Our next-door neighbors to the west, Bulgaria and Greece... What are our relations with these two countries like? We're virtually at each others' throats. Since the Bulgarians have implemented an effort to assimilate and thereby eradicate our kinsmen who live as Bulgarian citizens on Bulgarian soil, they have won the hatred of 50 million Turks. It's for this reason that our diplomatic relations with that country are extremely tense. Moreover, since the political regimes of that nation and Turkey are diametrically opposed to one another, and since the countries are in two separate camps, rather than friendship between the two countries, it's a question of their being virtual enemies.

All right, our relations with communist Bulgaria are like that, but are our relations with Greece, our other neighbor, with a capitalist and bourgeois democracy, very good? No, rather the opposite... The tension between Turkey and Greece, our supposed NATO ally, is greater than that with Bulgaria, because the areas of dispute are many. The conflict over territorial waters in the Aegean, the disagreement over the Aegean FIR [Flight Information Region] line, the Cyprus problem, and the oppression of our kinsmen in Greece, have from time to time brought the two neighbors to the very brink of war.

To summarize, relations with our neighbors to the west are worse than merely cool; they're actually at the level of animosity, a very strained type of relationship...

So let's turn to the south... To Syria just beneath us, and Iraq beyond. Of these countries, our problems with Syria seem to have no end. It's clear that the Syrians covet our territory from the maps they publish from time to time. They shelter the separatists, and turn a blind eye to their staging attacks across our common border. They vote against us in international organizations. Consequently, it's impossible to say that this nation has friendly relations with Turkey.

If not for its war with Iran over the past several years, Iraq's stance vis-a-vis Turkey would be no different from that of Syria. Their policy for years of trying to "Arabize" our kinsmen living in the Sulaimania, Mosul, and Kirkuk regions is not much different from Bulgaria's recent policy. Just as Syria does, Iraq shelters the separatists. Even putting the most positive face on the matter, are relations are not friendly, but rather cool.

Now to the east... Here we have Iran and the USSR. During the reign of the Shah, even though almost a third of the Iranian population consisted of Azeris and Turkomans, both groups being of Turkic origin, Iran with its policy of accentuating the Persian ethnic group forbade education in Turkish and always looked upon Turkey as an enemy. Now, with the Khomeini regime, even though an indifferent trade relationship is continuing, it is clear that Iran is not that favorably disposed toward Turkey.

As for our large neighbor to the northeast, the USSR: Except for the period of our War of Independence and the Ataturk era, we can't call Turkish-Soviet relations "friendly". The Soviets look upon us as an advance outpost of capitalism aimed right at their soft underbelly, and continue to threaten us over Kars and Ardahan or joint defense of the Bosphorous. As for us, with the bases we grant to the U.S., as well as the NATO bases on our soil, we are a continual worry to them. As a result, outside of mere form and empty talk, our relations can never move in the direction of a friendly relaxation.

Quite apart from our actual neighbors, it is difficult to say that we have bonds of friendship with such nations as France, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Holland, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, or Tunisia. West Germany's show of friendship means nothing more than a friendship arising out of commercial transactions. Britain's is the same. And our relations with the U.S., which we call our greatest friend and ally, are clear for all to see. It's the Americans who implement the arms embargo; it's they who establish the 7-to-10 ratio in aid to Greece and Turkey; it's they who impose quotas on our textile products, the only product we can export to their country; it's they who provide support to the genocide that the Armenians have launched against our diplomats... It's they who see Turkey as a cheap depot of soldiers and a forward base, and who imagine themselves to be masters over our country...

All right, how did Turkey arrive at this state?

While following the War of Independence and even until the end of World War Two there existed a Turkey with a respected place in the world, whose counsel was listened to and taken seriously... While there was a Turkey that signed the Balkan Pact with the Balkan countries, the Saadabad Pact with Iran, and a Friendship Agreement with the USSR, a Turkey that was at peace with the world and had adopted the principle of "peace at home and peace in the world", what did we ever do that today we're a nation surrounded by enemies on all sides?

Is it that all our neighbors are in the wrong and only we're in the right? Or did we somewhere make one or more major mistakes? Now that we're in this situation, let's sit down and think long and hard about it. Let's think, and review our foreign policy one more time, how about it?

9173
CSO: 3554/41

POLITICAL

TURKEY

FREEDOM OF SPEECH BAN LIFTED ON FORMER POLITICIANS

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 3 Apr 86 pp 1,11

[Text] Ankara (CUMHURIYET Bureau) - The draft law providing for a lifting of the restrictions on statements by former politicians has passed in the General Session of the Grand National Assembly. Only one parliamentarian, representing the DSP [Democratic Left Party] voted against the bill, which nullifies two paragraphs of law number 2969 restricting the speech of former politicians. In addition, by means of a paragraph appended to law number 2969, provision was made for the law to expire concurrently with the expiration of Provisional Article IV of the Constitution, which imposed a ban on political activity by former politicians.

Discussions on the draft law amending certain paragraphs of law number 2969, which began the previous day in the General Session of the Grand National Assembly, were completed yesterday. While the SHP [Social Democratic Populist Party] and DSP favored the complete repeal of law number 2969, the ANAP [Motherland Party] and MDP [Nationalist Democracy Party] favored retaining the provisions which prohibit criticism of the nation's leaders during the period the 12 September 1980 military takeover.

ANAP Ankara parliamentarian Alpaslan Pehlivanli, who spoke during the debates on the draft law, noted that there were those who favored the complete nullification of the law and said that "This law has a character which tends to prevent the disruption of the atmosphere of peace brought about by the 12 September intervention, and to prevent the situation of political conflict which had occurred in the past. Consequently, we see no benefit in its total repeal." Pointing out that the previous politicians were not traitors to the nation, Pehlivanli said "Those abroad who would say that there is no democracy in Turkey are saying it today anyway. But we'll save those who oppose the government merely because of this law from having to be in opposition."

Adana DSP parliamentarian Nuri Korkmaz, in a address in which he noted that there were still those around who had given their hearts to the former political parties, stated that "The pre-12 September parties are no longer on the scene, but there are still people who gave their hearts to them. Not a single traitor has emerged from those who carried responsibility in Turkey." He called for the law to be repealed in toto.

Korkmaz, announcing that he would give a negative vote because the law was not being completely annulled, spoke as follows: "Today, [the military takeovers of] 27 May [1960] and 12 March [1971] are being criticized. Are you guaranteeing that 12 September won't be criticized tomorrow?"

Following the debate, the draft law submitted to the Assembly by the government was accepted. According to the draft, political party members will be able to make statements either praising or criticizing the administrators of parties closed after 12 September. Former politicians will henceforth be able to give speeches and issue statements concerning Turkey's domestic and foreign politics.

However, the provisions of law number 2969 prohibiting statements which could lead to a renewal of a situation of political conflict and dispute similar to that prior to 12 September 1980 will still remain in force. Consequently, no statement or comment may be made which would be of a critical, denigrating, or disparaging nature vis-a-vis the decisions, communiques, or actions of the MGK [National Security Council].

9173

CSO: 3554/39

POLITICAL

TURKEY

BRIEFS

SPY TRIAL ENDS--Vehbi Kacan, a farmer who had gathered information on Turkish military units in Thrace and sold it to the Bulgarians, was captured by MIT [Turkish National Intelligence Organization] and has been sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for treason by the Military Court of the General Staff. Kacan, who in March 1983 took his sheep to graze on the edge of the Rezve Creek in the Macara area along the Turkish-Bulgarian border, established a friendship with a Bulgarian military officer named "Peter". The Bulgarian, telling Vehbi Kacan that there was no olive oil to be found in Bulgaria, gave him 3,000 lira and asked him to bring him some. As the friendship which thus began between Vehbi Kacan and the Bulgarian officer developed, Kacan went frequently to the same area and began to talk with the Turkish-speaking Peter. During one of these meetings, the Bulgarian asked Kacan, in return for money, to provide him with information on Turkish military units in the surrounding area. The traitor Vehbi Kacan accepted this proposal and began to gather information in the area without attracting notice. Later, the Bulgarian, who secretly conveyed Kacan into Bulgaria, took him to tour the cities of Burgaz and Varna and gave him a radio/tape-player. Following these favors, the farmer and spy Kacan placed information pertaining to Turkish units' border exercises in a jar in August 1983 and left it in a pre-determined spot on Bulgarian soil. As Vehbi Kacan was seeking to arrange a false identity card for the Bulgarian officer and take him to Istanbul, he was arrested by the National Intelligence Organization, which had closely monitored the affair. [Text] [Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 2 APR 86 p 2] 9173

CSO: 3554/41

MILITARY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

TURKEY STUDIES MIRAGE PURCHASE--Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal was interviewed by the AFP on Sunday 20 April upon completion of his 5-day visit to Paris. He told the press agency that his country "was studying a plan proposed by the Dassault company for the purchase of French Mirage 2000 combat aircraft" that could possibly "be built partly in Turkey". Ozal added that "this plan could be adopted, but we have made no decision as yet because we have to study its financial implications. Up to now, the Turks have never made any major arms purchases from France, having supplied themselves exclusively from the United States. Ozal revealed that Matra has also submitted "a missiles sale offer" to Turkish officials. He explained that this offer was likewise under study. He refused, however, to specify what types of missiles were involved. The Panavia British-German-Italian consortium has offered to sell Turkey its Tornado aircraft. The latter is, therefore, in competition with the Mirage 2000, as it was previously in Saudi Arabia where the Dassault aircraft lost the contract [Text] [Paris LE MONDE in French 22 Apr 86 p 10] 8041/9869

CSO: 3519/165

MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

CLOSER TACTICAL INTEGRATION OF ARMOR, ARMORED INFANTRY URGED

Bonn TRUPPENPRAXIS in German Jan/Feb 86 pp 36-39

[Article by Lt Col Alfred Zaengerle: "Armored Infantry Units 90 or Infantry-Reinforced Armored Battalions"]

[Text] The debate about the combat units of the future--particularly the infantry units--goes on. The following article exclusively represents the author's personal views which he herewith offers as an additional contribution to this debate.

I have followed the debate about the armored combat units of the future with interest which began with an article that appeared in the 3/82 issue of TRUPPENPRAXIS. I have noted with satisfaction that the organizational charts of the future already provide for a mix of armored units. I had submitted a proposal along these lines to then chief of the general staff on 8 January 1976. But at that time my views were not listened to. My ideas, based on admittedly incomplete experience and knowledge concerning the use of armored infantry units as a deputy battalion commander of a mixed battalion of an armored regiment, led me to the realization that it was absolutely necessary to provide for the reinforcement of armored infantry battalions with battle tanks as part of the basic organizational structure. The past and present organizational and operational concept of this battalion neither makes sense without armored reinforcement, nor is it adequate to the threat. In the final analysis, it is anachronistic and must be viewed as a stopgap measure in the face of limited budgetary means. The proposed concept does make the armored infantry battalion more survivable to a certain extent but does not solve the problems that I can see.

Mix According to Basic Organization Plan or Tactical Grouping

First, let me say a word about the mix according to basic organizational concepts or tactical grouping. Both options have their advantages and disadvantages which were outlined by a responsible authority.² There are examples for both options in the ground forces of different countries. The mix in the Soviet army and the armed forces of its allies as well as in the U.S. Army is by tactical grouping. The French army mixes its armored

units organizationally down to the company level. Based on my experience of 3 years as a deputy and S-3 staff officer of a mixed armored battalion and 4 years as commanding officer of a pure breed armored battalion, I would strongly urge mixing units along organizational lines. It is the only way to prepare the leadership cadres for the close cooperation and mutual understanding required to cope with a national emergency. With all due respect for his experience in the matter,² the one negative example cited by General Ritz from his inspector days² as an argument against mixing cannot really be termed representative. But as far as mixing units along organizational lines below the battalion level is concerned the disadvantages would appear to outweigh the advantages from the training point³ of view, as the example of the heavy companies demonstrated in the past. The training argument is a significant one which sets limits to the demands to be placed on a "unit" both in terms of personnel and equipment. After all, there was a good reason for the Bundeswehr to switch back from the quarterly to the uniform replenishment system. Similar problems would probably come up within a given unit, if it were trained on two systems which differ both in terms of technology and operational use.

More Battle Tanks, Firepower Characterize Threat

Let me now turn to the threat trend by pointing out the "increase in the quantitative superiority of the Warsaw Pact ground forces over the past 10 years"⁴ as exemplified by the following figures which bear repeating:

5,000 battle tanks and 870 armored personnel carriers;

1,400 artillery pieces

300 multiple rocket launchers

1,100 attack and multipurpose helicopters⁴

This leads us to the logical conclusion that the battle tank will probably continue to serve as the primary weapons system of the WP ground forces.⁴ But we are faced with a major contradiction, if an assessment of our own future capabilities concludes that "based on current information, there is no weapons system in prospect which might replace the battle tank as the key piece of equipment used by armored combat units or which would be in a position to take over its functions."⁴ On the other hand we are told that "the somewhat tank-oriented organizational structure of the armed forces should be altered in favor of the infantry through the addition of armored infantry units to armored combat units with as much dismounted personnel strength as possible."⁵ Does the Bundeswehr and the West overall have too many battle tanks; can the dismounted infantryman equipped with a panzerfaust or a longer-range antitank weapon destroy an enemy tank more efficiently and cheaply after all or is this contradiction merely the result of faulty thinking?

If one analyzes the operational and organizational principles and the maneuvers of the WP forces in terms of where and how the abovementioned increase in weaponry is in evidence, one must not only reckon with projected World War II-type breakthrough sectors with increased massing of battle tanks and firepower but also with greater "armor density" and firepower both in the course of subsequent combat operations and along the whole length of the front sector. Let me now characterize the major aspects of the breakthrough battle to the extent that they have a bearing on the basic premise and the assessment of a defense concept:

- behind a screen of armored reconnaissance units insofar as these are required to complement other reconnaissance data and/or to take account of terrain conditions,
- following planned or ordered combat support fire of hardly imaginable dimensions,
- an attack is launched by battle tank-reinforced infantry units or by battle tanks alone (depending on terrain) with no concern for losses and with continuous replacement of disabled battle tanks by battle tanks from succeeding waves or reserve units. The attacking battle tanks would be deployed along the width of the battle line and limited only by obstructing each other's forward movement.
- Supported by attack helicopters directing their fire against armored and unarmored targets,
- they take advantage of every existing breach in the line of our delaying/defending forces, breaking through in order to attack our frontline units on the flanks or from the rear or to attack our reserves.

Limiting our discussion to the battlefield and to conventional weapons, the defense plan, for now and the foreseeable future, will be based on the solution of the following problems--at least as far as breakthrough sectors are concerned:

- deployment of threat-adequate weaponry in a solid line, if possible. Making the enemy focal points agree with our own as well as the desired density and a colonment in depth of these weapons will determine the losses of terrain to be accepted. Every such loss puts a strain on strength and of necessity reduces depth.

- armor-plating the weapons to protect them against enemy combat support fire or else taking out enemy batteries before they can become effective;
- simultaneous destruction of enemy battle tanks and supporting attack helicopters which presupposes that the FEBA-deployed weapons are suited for anti-helicopter defense or that frontline special weaponry has been fully integrated;
- destruction of other weapons.

The battle tank would seem to be the best-suited, all-round weapon under this concept. This also raises the question of how many battle tanks can actually be funded and what numbers of other combat units are absolutely necessary. The terrain of our defense areas should not be judged in the conventional way according to tank-favorable and tank-unfavorable but we should take into consideration that any path that is wide enough and any firebreak will accommodate attacking enemy tanks and the infantry units accompanying them.

The Weapon System--The APC Concept and Its Execution

Starting out with the question of the type of battlefield situation in which battle tanks require infantry support, it is worth noting the following:

The battle tank needs an infantry component the more closely tied to broken terrain it is and the longer it will be expected to operate there. If it can take full advantage of its tactical mobility, it will be less exposed to threats and will be able to select a position where the infantry threat is least serious.

This then is the concept for the operational means which will provide infantry support to the battle tank:

- in terms of mobility, it must satisfy the same requirements as the battle tank itself;
- it must provide for the movement of infantry units protected against enemy artillery fire and/or past stationary infantry units and make it possible to conduct mounted combat operations, if necessary.

To my mind, there are two possible ways of solving the problem. Choosing between them will decide the question of whether there is such a thing as a unified formation combining infantry and armored units in one branch of service, based on their operational mission.

1. The delivery system serves solely as an armored personnel carrier and in order to support its personnel against unarmored and lightly armored enemy units. It follows under the protection of the battle tanks or these provide support against enemy tanks. According to the weapons ratio dependent on terrain, these units will thus be more or less "infantry-reinforced" armored battalions.

2. Partial armor and suitable weaponry enable the delivery system to engage enemy tanks on a one-on-one basis. In this case, the system would take on the configuration of an armored attack personnel carrier, as the author of this letter to the editor has demonstrated so convincingly.⁶ A battalion equipped in this manner may be infantry-reinforced, if necessary, by means of the previously mentioned transported infantry units or enhanced in its thrust by means of battle tanks. Since it is capable of fulfilling most combat assignments resulting from threat situations, it may properly be called a formation of the combat forces.

The Infantry: A Building Block or a Foreign Element in the System of Armored Combat Units

Both versions have their advantages and disadvantages. They are not mutually exclusive but in fact complement each other, depending on the terrain and the type of mission. When properly mixed, they must balance out advantages and disadvantages with regard to antitank capability or the added infantry units they are capable of providing by means of cooperation and teamwork. While the attack personnel carrier can merely dismount an infantry screen which is to make it possible to hold to the area for an unlimited period of time by keeping those sectors of the terrain under surveillance which the weapons system is unable to see, the APC satisfies any additional demand for ground troops. In assessing the required number of dismounted infantry units for the armored combat troop system, demand should rarely exceed usual levels in average terrain. This is not to say that there will not be a need for infantry units in unit strength and, at times, even in excess of that.

But any defense concept must take into account that the infantry, even in prepared sites, both in the First and the Second World War was literally chopped to pieces by fire--and in both cases we are talking about battle-tested infantry units. In that sense, the infantry units of the Bundeswehr had better not be exposed to the increased fire impact during the initial stage of hostilities. Leaving aside the risks of deployment and the additional time factor needed by the infantry to prepare its positions, they should not be committed in forward areas as long as the enemy can make use of the full potential of his artillery. To use the infantry as a forward fulcrum³ around which the operations of armored combat forces would revolve, would be to overextend and/or to sacrifice these units.

It makes more sense--as provided for under the present structure--to commit these units in suitable terrain in the depth of the combat sectors of major formations in such a manner that they can take over, if need be, from hard-pressed armored formations and stop the enemy advance so that the former may regroup and be redeployed to provide relief once the halted enemy starts to mass his artillery and combat strength to attack these focal points in the depth.

For other follow-on operations, too, after the first few hours of fighting infantry units in formation strength are needed to join forces with armored combat units. As a rule, however, these infantry units are assigned a mission-related function by means of tactical grouping or as replacements and/or flown into the actual operating area by helicopter. These units need not necessarily be an integral part of the armored combat forces. In their building block function, the only requirement is to integrate that portion which is normally needed in all types of operations. Only if such a building block has a reasonable chance of holding its own against an enemy tank--which it is more than likely to encounter in any type of armored combat situation--will it be able to preserve its independence. Otherwise, the dependence on the armored units is obfuscated by the constraints of peacetime training and, in the final analysis, is cast in concrete down to the unit level by means of basic organizational patterns or regular tactical grouping. This system is more than visible in the Soviet army where armored battalions are divided up from the start and their battle tanks are assigned to individual armored infantry squads, if need be.

If this dependence is to be overcome, infantry means of transport and infantry-supplying, duel-capable antitank weapons in the system of armored combat forces must be properly integrated in one combined unit. In principle, this will help to overcome the following weaknesses of the current armored infantry concept and the one proposed here: in antitank defense; in the termination of hostilities and in the command structure.

"Fireproof" Antitank Defense

The prime requirement of coherent defense is that no gap in the line must be permitted to occur once hostilities have reached their greatest intensity. This can only be achieved, if there is a high likelihood that weapons operating side by side will survive the artillery fire and, if need be, take up their position under enemy fire and destroy enemy armor. If one of these requirements is not adequately met, the enemy tanks will overcome the remaining resistance while the accompanying enemy infantry units smash it totally.

"An armored weapons system," capable of firing various types of ammunition from a high-performance piece,⁶ is more likely to provide survivability and effectiveness than shaped-charge weapons. In terms of reaction time, however, it must not be too much inferior to the performance standards of a battle tank because the terrain in which armored infantry units are normally used is divided into small segments. This state of affairs must either be taken into account by increasing weapon density or reducing reaction time, if the enemy attacks in some unexpected fashion. Under the circumstances, the weapons system must have an adequate field of traverse because any change of position would otherwise involve a serious loss of time.

Every gap opens up flanks on which defender and attacker are equally vulnerable. Since the chances of success in individual duels are less calculable on the flanks, the danger is, in principle, that the greater numbers will carry the day. For this reason, it is equally important to provide mobility for the armored combat units and to preserve a solid line. If some other combat unit is to operate alongside the armored units in terrain where an armored enemy is likely to launch an attack, it must have a "fireproof" antitank defense at its disposal.

Breaking Off Hostilities Under Fire

Under present and foreseeable conditions, the antitank defense strength of a given formation determines its capability to break off hostilities locally, if need be and to resume fighting in a more favorable location with minimum loss of terrain. The reasons for such a decision may be operationally pre-planned or may be an inevitable consequence of the action itself which calls for helping the unit avoid dropping below critical strength and restore the proper relationship between time, area and strength. In some instances, quality must even give way to quantity and to the best armor. The Golan fighting in 1973 is a good example of this when the Israelis surrendered territory in the face of an attack by superior forces and suffered substantial losses in combat effectiveness in spite of their advantages in terrain and position.

The proper utilization of the depth of the defense areas and delaying tactics in general call for breaking off hostilities in a planned and successive manner.

Substantial attrition of the enemy in the covering area calls for more than merely firing long-range antitank weapons at the enemy vanguard and his armored combat reconnaissance units. What it does call for is to make use of suitable terrain and to deploy one's forces in as broad a line as possible at least for a brief period of time so as to cause a "traffic jam" of enemy forces. For this purpose infantry squads are needed which not so much prevent close engagements between the APCs and the enemy's motorized infantry units but which are supposed to make

sure that a combat effective enemy does not push past through gaps in the formation and take up position in the rear of their own forces.

One has to have been out in the terrain and seen with one's own eyes how long it takes nowadays to establish infantry units in prepared positions and how threatened they are during this time in order to understand how much lead time is required for the decision to break off an engagement. To do this, the responsible commanders must have a sixth sense. Otherwise, the positions may be given up too soon and the enemy will not be worn down or the decision is made too late and the unit, including its APCs will be badly mauled as it breaks off the engagement. The removal of the Marder tank and the addition of antitank combat vehicles to the armored infantry companies are not likely to bring about any changes in this regard. The only thing that would really help would be a system capable of fighting armored duels and possibly destroying the forward enemy tank formations while the last of the infantrymen climb aboard.

The present difficulty--so as not to say, impossibility--of breaking off an engagement is appreciated in infantry circles as well and has led to the demand to move the prepared positions and the last line of resistance to the rear limits of the defense area in hopes that breaking off engagements will become unnecessary either as a result of operational decisions by the command echelons or altogether.

Command Problems of Mounted and Dismounted Forces

"One who is concerned" has added his voice to the discussion of the command problem as it applies to the current infantry concept and has cited it as a reason for dropping the Marder. The problem arises in principle because weapons with different ranges and different requirements for cover by means of terrain are being combined with one another. The coordination of the weapons takes a lot of time and, in the final analysis, the commander himself must decide on the spot on a position and a particular weapon. Leaving aside the question of how difficult it often is to find sectors of terrain where the different weapons may sensibly be coordinated³, it will in the end depend on the type of enemy and the approach he takes whether one's own forces as well as the commander are properly positioned and how rapidly the differing components break apart in combat.

In this context, a large-scale field study, like the one conducted to test the formation of the armored company contained in Army Model 4, would surely be of help. It might tell us whether the proposed makeup of the armored infantry company would solve these particular command problems or whether the entire concept will have to be reworked.

My proposal does not solve the command problem either; it merely reduces it in size. In those sectors of the terrain where weapons systems suited to armored duels operate combat proceeds according to their mission profile and the dismounted infantry units merely provide a security screen. In general, the armored infantry units in their APCs are transported in the mounted mode and engage in combat in the dismounted mode according to infantry rules. The location and duration of the engagements will depend on realizable protection against enemy armor and/or on the cover provided by weapons suited to one-on-one armored combat to cover their evasive maneuvers.

Reservations regarding the operational concept proposed here have also been stated with respect to the organizational patterns. Aside from the combat support and reinforcement provided by other elements, the following components are to be coordinated at the battalion level:

- battle tanks;
- armored infantry combat vehicle;
- antitank combat vehicle;
- high-angle weapon component;
- anti-helicopter component.

If the dismounted infantry is thought of as a separate component, then

- four units and/or
- six different elements with different mission profiles and logistic requirements

will be used on the battlefield. As far as I am concerned, the issue of the proper operational concept already comes up in peacetime, in the absence of an enemy and of any terrain.

As I look at the most recent example of mechanized warfare, the 1973 Israeli-Arab war, I have my doubts as to whether the German armored infantry philosophy which originated in and was tailored to the World War II enemy still makes sense, can be justified and therefore retained in view of the changes in the threat which have taken place in the meantime.

As an "armor type," I see and wish for a combat unit in addition to the armored component in the system of armored combat formations. But the essential features of such a unit must fulfill the abovementioned requirement profiles. If sufficient funds to equip all our armored infantry battalions in this manner are not available, we could make do with interim solutions such as other large armies must live with as well.

In principle, after all, these armies conduct their combat operations

- in a mechanized mode with armored battalions reinforced by transported infantry--and the number of armored personnel carriers may in fact exceed the number of battle tanks
- and in the dismounted mode with infantry units reinforced by battle tanks.

FOOTNOTES

1. The Jan 1984 article dealt with the plans which had been made public by that time. SOLDAT UND TECHNIK, No 3/1985, p 116f discusses an antitank armored personnel carrier which represents a step in the direction indicated here. But only time will tell whether technical constraints and cost benefit analyses will not lead to higher costs and to some APC which will carry substantially more infantrymen than the Marder.
2. Alfred Ritz, letter to the editor on "Thoughts about Armored Combat Units of the Future," TRUPPENPRAXIS, No 7/1982, p 510ff.
3. Klaus-Peter Schoetensack, letter to the editor on same article, TRUPPENPRAXIS, No 12/1982, p 925ff.
4. Gero Koch, Joachim Bauers, "Thoughts about Armored Combat Units of the Future," TRUPPENPRAXIS, No 3/1982, pp 177, 183.
5. Gero Koch, "Armored Infantry Units 90," TRUPPENPRAXIS, No 12/1983, p 882.
6. Herbert Stark on "Thoughts about Armored Combat Units of the Future," TRUPPENPRAXIS No 8/1982, p 574ff.
7. Dankmut Schinzer, "Tactics in the 1973 Near East War," TRUPPENPRAXIS, No 1/1981, p 44ff.
8. Joerg Bahr, "Thoughts on Defending Armored Combat Units--with Special Emphasis on on Armored Infantry Units," KAMPFTRUPPEN, No 3/1981, p 105ff.
9. Markus Hendel on "Thoughts about Armored Combat Units of the Future," TRUPPENPRAXIS, No 8/1982, p 586.

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MILITARY

FRANCE

DEFENSE ROLE OF PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER OUTLINED

President Preeminent in Defense Affairs

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 21 Mar 86 pp 30-31

[Article by Henri Eyraud]

[Text] Whose finger is on the "nuclear button"? The president's. Who makes the decision to conduct major overseas operations? The president. Who determines France's main strategic policy orientations? The president. And what is the prime minister's role in all this? His is a supporting role as manager-administrator and coordinator.

That was the way Charles de Gaulle wanted things in 1958 with the president as a commander in chief, the prime minister as a chief of staff. And there must be no confounding the two. The Constitution, however, was not as specific, far from it. That document is even ambiguous. Its Article 15 states that the president is the commander in chief of the armed forces, whereas its Article 20 says that the prime minister "has the armed forces at his disposal," and Article 21 that the prime minister is responsible for national defense. The decree of 14 January 1964 clarified the issue, stating that only the president can authorize employment of the nuclear forces. The prime minister is, therefore, only the first among the ministers. In defense affairs, the president makes all the decisions.

Use of Nuclear Weapons

There is no doubt whatsoever that here the president is the sole decision-maker.

Overseas Military Intervention

Here again, the president decides. President Valery Giscard d'Estaing alone made the decision to dispatch the 2d Foreign Paratroop Regiment to Kolwezi, Zaire, in 1975. He did so in close consultation with General Guy Mery, the armed forces chief of staff at the time. The 16 February 1986 attack on the Libyan airstrip at Wadi Doum, in northern Chad, by French fighter-bombers, and Operation Epervier were both ordered by the president in consultation with the defense minister and the armed forces chief of staff.

Major Strategic Policy Orientations

These are likewise a presidential prerogative, in any event until 16 March. De Gaulle had created the Defense Council to back him in such matters. This council is a monarchical body in which the president sovereignly settles all questions after having listened to whom he wants, and when he wants. Here again, the opinion of a military leader may be deemed more acceptable than the prime minister's. And yet the Defense Council is the forum in which armed forces equipment programs are discussed. For instance, what missiles should be selected for the deterrent forces? What aircraft should the French Air Force have in the year 2000? France's strategy is determined in this council.

Administration-Management

The president keeps himself in the background on such matters. But the prime minister still remains apart. Everyday management of the armed forces is the responsibility of the defense minister who also oversees the arms industry and its 300,000 employees.

In fact, the prime minister does not intervene until money matters have to be discussed. The minister of economy and finance controls the purse strings. The defense minister prepares his annual budgets and the 5-year military programming law under the former's watchful eye. The prime minister can--at last!--have his say when interministerial disputes are submitted to arbitration. It is incumbent upon him to coordinate whatever is within the jurisdiction of each minister and to personally direct whatever is common to all of them.

To assist him in this task, the prime minister has a sort of secretariat of state housed in a wing of the Hotel des Invalides, namely the SGDN or General Secretariat for National Defense. The SGDN is a veritable kingpin among all ministries concerned with defense affairs. It has many and diverse functions, including protection of the civilian population, territorial defense, disarmament, arms export sales, etc.

Yet, despite its official attachment to Matignon [office of the prime minister], the SGDN often works in behalf of the Elysee. There is an administrative level for everyday matters, a prime minister level in case of differences between ministries, and an Elysee level for vital or reserved subjects. Will this continue to be the case? What would happen if tomorrow the Elysee and Matignon were to move in opposite directions or if the SGDN were to "boycott" the Elysee?

But the SGDN does not play an essential role as far as the Elysee is concerned. The latter enjoys other occasional ties, such as, for example, with the armed forces general staff and the intelligence services that maintain direct communication with the presidential staff on important questions or in a crisis situation.

Is "cohabitation" [political power-sharing] possible in defense matters? There is no doubt that in such matters the president holds preponderant constitutional powers. A serious conflict within the executive would be poorly viewed by the military and certainly be considered unacceptable in the midst of a crisis. But a firmly united government will undoubtedly manage to impose its strategic and budgetary views. This is an additional reason for moving quickly and authoritatively in 1986 while the unity of the government of cohabitation and the new prime minister's capacity to arbitrate still remain intact.

President, Prime Minister to Compromise

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 21 Mar 86 p 31

[Interview with Samy Cohen, researcher at the National Political Science Foundation and author of "La Monarchie Nucleaire" [The Nuclear Monarchy], Hachette, by Bruno Seznec; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] Whom will the armed forces chief of staff obey on 17 March?

[Answer] The president and... the prime minister. Such is the ambiguity of the Constitution and a 1971 decree on command of the armed forces. The military have two bosses: the president who is their commander in chief, and the prime minister who is responsible for national defense and "has the armed force at his disposal."

[Question] In other words, military leaders would be the arbiters of "cohabitation" in defense matters?

[Answer] Yes, in a way. Everything depends on their answer to the question "Whom must we obey?" in the event of disagreement between the Elysee and Matignon. Such a situation would lead certain officers to settle some problems at their own level. Take an extreme hypothetical case, in Africa, for example. If the Elysee and Matignon were to paralyze each other, it would be surprising if the army remained impassive under enemy fire and did not take conservative defense measures. The decision would be made on-the-spot by the army itself.

[Question] Who presses the nuclear button?

[Answer] The president. There is unanimous agreement on this point. But this is the most important and, at the same time, the least important issue. So far, the RPR [Rally for the Republic] and the UDF [Union for French Democracy] both acknowledge that responsibility for the use of nuclear weapons rests with the president. This is a very inexpensive concession for them to make because the risk of a nuclear holocaust remains improbable.

Nevertheless, while the president stands upon his apparent dignity as nuclear monarch, the government may decide to fight him on foreign policy and attack the treaties or accords he negotiated. As a result, France's credibility would suffer greatly. Our allies would ask themselves? "Who makes the decisions in Paris?" and "What would happen in a serious crisis?"

In France, he who directs defense policy must also direct foreign policy. For this reason, entrusting the president with nuclear responsibility while denying him the right to act on the international level would have pernicious effects.

[Question] Francois Mitterrand says that if the government were to "confiscate" foreign policy, this would be a coup d'etat...

[Answer] And the opposition clearly saw the trap! By retaining control of foreign and military policy, Mitterrand will also seek to assert himself in major strategic and economic decisions. Because defense is not solely the armed forces. It is also the economy and industry, telecommunications and transportation. But all these are under Matignon's authority. After 16 March, Mitterrand will no longer be a monarch. The year 1986 will be a paradise lost for him.

[Question] Are you saying that cohabitation will be hell?

[Answer] Not necessarily hell. At least not in the next few months, because it is not in the best interest of a cohabitating prime minister to destabilize the president and "humiliate" the institution of the presidency. The prime minister too may well have presidential ambitions! Hence compromises will, of necessity, have their place.

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MILITARY

GREECE
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BRIEFS

REPORTED WASTE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT--Outside the disposal area of the 129th Air Force Support Wing at the Ellinikon [Air Base] there were some machines that must be worth several tens of millions. Among them are a press, a piece of equipment that sharpens valves and several others. We ask: 1) Is it true that when the aircraft plant belonging to the government went to Ellinikon, the officials in charge did not know (?) what to do with the machine tools and left them exposed to the elements outside the Third Warehouse of the plant? 2) Is it true that this happened in 1981 and from that time on NO ONE thought to take these machines and use them either at the KEA [State Aircraft Factory] or at the EAV [Greek Aircraft Industry], as happened with the other equipment? 3) Is it true that these machines were left exposed for 5 whole years, until they were moved at the beginning of the month to the disposal area of the 129th Support Wing, where various "useless pieces of equipment" are gathered in order to be sold at auction for the benefit of the Air Force Pension Fund? 4) Is it true that some unknown officials finally became aware of this affair and stopped the proceedings? AND IMAGINE, after the equipment was inspected, it was found out that in spite of their having been abandoned for 5 years and exposed to the rain, dust and humidity, many of the machines could be repaired and used to good advantage!!! [Text] [Athens PONDIKI in Greek 30 Apr 86 p 5] /12858

LIBYANS' TRAINING QUESTIONED--Can a country member of the Atlantic Alliance train future officers of the Libyan army, whose installations are the target of a leader of the Alliance? How many of the Army Cadet School students are Libyans? And will they continue their studies there? [Text] [Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 30 Apr-8 May 86 p 7] /12858

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

DEFENSE EXPERTS HOLD DEBATE ON NATURE OF THREAT PICTURE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 4 Apr 86 p 20

[Article by Anders Ohman]

[Text] An isolated attack against Sweden must be among the conceivable war scenarios for which the military must plan. This statement was made by Einar Lyth, a brigadier general, during a defense debate at the military academy in Stockholm.

High-ranking officers debated with civilian defense experts, including Nils Gylden, a department head at the Defense Ministry and an expert adviser to the Defense Committee. The subject of the debate was "The Threat to Sweden: Early Attack, Initial Attack, or Isolated Attack?"

Einar Lyth painted an extremely bleak picture of the threat to Sweden. During the fifties and sixties Sweden was not an attractive region for an attack. Today the situation has changed. Swedish territory is suitable for bases to serve the navy and combat planes of foreign powers. In the present situation, it may be assumed that an attacker has already planned an isolated attack against Sweden.

Soviet Aggressor

The Soviet Union is the conceivable attacker. This was clearly indicated during the debate, although it was seldom mentioned.

Nils Gylden of the Defense Ministry was the main skeptic of the evening. He soothed the harsh military tones with his encouraging conclusions.

The security policy report of the Defense Committee is based on the belief that the danger of war in Europe has not increased. On the other hand, if war breaks out, it is more probable today that the Nordic countries, including Sweden, will be drawn in. But this is not a question of an isolated attack, but a major war in Europe.

Full Control

"NATO believes that the Soviet Union is not so expansionistic. The Defense Committee believes that the superpowers will strike only when the risks are small. An isolated attack against Sweden would be a highly risky operation, Nils Gylden said.

"Control of the Baltic Sea is a must to the Soviet Union," said Claes Thornberg, rear admiral and chief of the Coastal Fleet. Taking Sweden during a crisis would be one step toward establishing this control. The goal of the aggressor would be defensive--to establish air defenses and protection for naval forces.

He saw two conceivable possibilities for an isolated attack against Sweden--a quick attack with a massive military effort or a slow process.

"Once the aggressor has forced his will on us, we will have lost," Claes Thornberg said.

Gunnar Jervas of FOA (Defense Research Institute) said that the term "isolated attack" was misleading. "Initial attack" was better, he said.

Offensive Air Force

Brigadier General Goran Tode of the Air Force said that such an attack would be a good way for an aggressor to gain superiority quickly. He did not believe there would be such an attack from the West.

There are neither resources nor strategic motivation for such a move. It is more reasonable to assume that the threat comes from the East. The Warsaw Pact's buildup of offensive air forces is an indication of this.

If an isolated attack against Sweden is to be kept isolated, no third party, such as the United States and NATO, may step in with military force to prevent an invasion and occupation.

Einar Lyth listed several possible causes of such passivity. NATO could refrain from stepping in if an attack against Sweden were not seen as a threat to the vital interests of NATO. NATO could find it difficult to decide whether or not to step in. It could be difficult to achieve unity. Vital interests could be threatened, but NATO may refrain from stepping in because of the danger that nuclear or chemical weapons could be used. Military resources could be tied up elsewhere. There could be domestic reasons such as a presidential election. Soviet and Warsaw Pact involvement in Sweden could be used by the United States and NATO to advance their military positions in other regions. This could be in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, or in Finnmark/Spetsbergen.

Isolated Attack

"Does not an isolated attack against Sweden mean a major change in Europe? How could an attacker be sure that no countermeasures would be taken?" Nils Gylden asked. He received no clear answer.

Gunnar Jervas of FOA, also a skeptic concerning the threat, could imagine the situation being changed if one of the superpowers believed there would be a war.

Rear Adm Claes Thornberg quoted the analysis of a United States admiral, who said that the Soviet Union was defensively expansionistic and wanted to establish buffer zones to protect its territory.

"If we happen to be in the way, then so much the worse for us," said Claes Thornberg. He used Afghanistan and Grenada as examples of isolated attacks against countries.

MILITARY

SWEDEN

BALTIC SEEN OVERLOOKED AS WAR ZONE IN SECURITY DEBATE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 29 Mar 86 p 2

[Commentary by Olof Santesson]

[Text] More attention should be devoted to the Baltic Sea as a possible war zone in the Swedish security policy debate. This is the most important military region close to us, along with the Arctic North.

It may be assumed that the Swedish military staffs are deeply involved with conditions in this region. In the general debate, however, there is very little analysis of the resources and possibilities of the two military blocs with regard to Sweden, in the event of an armed conflict.

Consequently, this year's first edition of FINSK TIDSKRIFT contains a valuable contribution by researcher Steve Lindberg on the Baltic Sea as a "sea of wrath" and as a difficult war zone.

His purpose is to question what he calls two myths.

- 1) The job of the Soviet Baltic Fleet is to break out of the Baltic Sea and, along with the Northern Fleet from Murmansk, attack Norway and NATO's Atlantic facilities during the initial stage of a war.
- 2) The Baltic Sea is beginning to play a new role in NATO's strategy of nuclear deterrence and war.

Like many others, Lindberg believes that breaking out through the Danish sound is not a high priority for the Baltic Sea Fleet. He also believes that it is extremely difficult to draw any definite conclusions concerning NATO's nuclear threat in the Baltic Sea region.

Of great interest, however, is this Finnish researcher's compilation of the two sides' material capabilities for devoting themselves to one strategy or the other.

Lindberg points out that the number of heavier units, ships larger than corvettes, has dropped in the Baltic Sea fleet since the 1970's. The number of missile cruisers and missile destroyers has been reduced by more than half. They have been replaced by missile frigates of the modern Krivak class.

The Soviet fleet in the Baltic Sea includes about 550 units, 150 of which are small vessels under 100 tons. According to Lindberg, "It seems clear that the Soviet naval dominance is not so great that breaking out through the Danish belt would seem particularly plausible," even though reinforcements would come through the White Sea Canal from the Northern Fleet.

Of interest here is the report that the West German Federal Navy has been given more and more assignments in the North Atlantic since the 1970's. These have had no connection with the Danish sound.

The Soviet Union needs a large number of antisubmarine units to protect sea transports from the Gulf of Finland to Poland and East Germany.

The number of Soviet submarines is reported to have been relatively constant since the 1970's. The new submarine of the Kilo class, which was observed when the Swedish ship Orion had its collision with a Soviet minesweeper, seems to have left the Baltic Sea, according to Lindberg.

There are probably few naval targets for the use of nuclear weapons in the inland sea, according to the Finn, but he does not rule out the possibility that nuclear charges could be used against Swedish naval bases installed in rocky areas or for mining narrow sounds.

Lindberg is even more cautious when it comes to the possible use of military aircraft.

"Soviet fighters and fighter-bombers from bases in Poland and the Baltic republics can operate throughout the Baltic Sea, Denmark, all of southern Sweden up to the Stockholm region, and over the entire eastern coast of Sweden up to Kvarken," he said.

With bases on Jutland and in northern Germany, NATO can operate with maximum combat effectiveness north of Gotland.

Effective nuclear strikes by NATO fighter-bombers north of Gotland are questionable according to Lindberg, however, because of their limited operational range, although individual strikes of this kind cannot be ruled out.

NATO fighter-bombers are said to have been given so many other conventional assignments that there are hardly enough of them for nuclear tasks. In addition, Soviet fighters from the Baltic area probably would have air superiority over large sections of the Baltic Sea.

Steve Lindberg sees a close link between the nuclear problem and cruise missiles, in particular.

He points out, however, that prolonged passage over open sea is not suitable for these missiles, since they must control their flight path with the help of terrain formations.

He believes that the primary task of the Swedish Air Force during a crisis would be to protect the central portions of Sweden. On the other hand, the southern

coastal regions and Gotland could not be protected so effectively that penetration by missiles could be ruled out.

In this case, it must be assumed that Soviet fighters would enter neutral air space to ward off the enemy, according to Lindberg.

Certain American defense circles have proposed the idea of letting fast vessels with cruise missiles operate in the Baltic Sea. It would be more feasible, however, to let submarines with cruise missiles lie in wait in the inland sea.

In his conclusions, Steve Lindberg is careful to point out that military conditions in the Baltic Sea are not static.

He speaks of several "changeable variables."

One such variable is the effort on the part of the West to force the Soviet Union to transfer defense resources northward out of Central Europe.

Another, not altogether surprisingly, is the author's impression that the Soviet Union is exerting stronger and stronger military pressure for political purposes in the Baltic Sea, "including Swedish waters."

According to Steve Lindberg, the goal of this "military bodybuilding" is to support a long-standing effort to make the Baltic Sea into a sea of peace--on Soviet terms. But there is no shortage of articles on this topic in our debate here in Sweden.

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

STRENGTHENED INVASION-DEFENSE MINEFIELD OFF NYKOPING

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 17 Apr 86 p 20

[Article by Sture Ryman]

[Text] Norrkoping--A belt of mines nearly 5 kilometers long is to be laid in Orsbaken off Oxelosund and Nykoping. Next summer, mines will also be laid in Bra Bay and in the approach to Norrkoping. The Navy has received additional funds with which to expand its invasion defense.

But it is not happening without grumbling both from professional fishermen and from people who use the archipelago either as boaters or as recreational fishermen. Anchoring will be banned in large areas, as will landing on a number of islets and skerries. A ban will be placed on fishing not only with trawls and drift nets but also with eel fykes, nets, hooks, and jigs.


"All fishing will be banned, that is quite clear," says Captain Donald Wedel of the Eastern Military Command, "and a few islands will be closed to the public. But we will try to limit the restrictions.

"The minefield in Orsbaken will measure 4.5 kilometers by 2 kilometers. The Eastern Military Command is responsible for defending the coasts of Ostergotland, Sormland, Uppland, and Gotland, and since the Navy has gotten more funds, we are expanding our invasion defense all along our 270-kilometer-long coast.

"We are dealing with a large area here in Orsbaken, so we must have a decision by the County Government Board. As far as the rest is concerned, I cannot comment or say anything about our plans."

Circulated for Comment

The Sormland County Government Board has circulated the military request to lay mines in Orsbaken for comment to Oxelosund and Nykoping, which are the municipalities concerned, and to the Fisheries Board. Regardless of what those concerned say in their comments, the County Government Board will pass a resolution giving the military permission to lay mines at the end of May. Everyone understands the need for effective protection, and seafarers have not



The minefield in Orsbaken will be 4.5 kilometers long and 2 kilometers wide. Bra Bay will also be mined next summer. The reason is that the Navy wants to strengthen its invasion defense.

been able to prevent the building of military facilities on the islands. That construction has been going on since last summer.

The mines will be anchored on the sea bottom and connected to each other by an electronic strip making it possible to detonate them by remote control. Permission to lay mines in Bra Bay was granted several years ago, and the minelaying will be done next summer. Effective 30 June 1987, all trawl fishing will be prohibited there.

Trawler skipper Thorsten Pettersson is one of those being hurt by the ban on fishing. He leases a number of islands in Orsbaken chiefly for his eel fishing. DAGENS NYHETER met him in the drift snow on the Hummel Bay pier as he and Lasse Jonsson, another trawler skipper, were landing 10 metric tons of Baltic herring--an unusually good catch.

He said: "Well, what can a person do? I realize that they must put a stop to the submarine intrusions--not because I have seen anything, but it happens, of course. But it isn't any fun.

"The people that make the decisions are taking a little bit of water here and a little more there. Pretty soon fishing will be banned everywhere. The SSAB [State Steel Corporation] is going to unload coal from barges at the fishing ground inside Bra Bay, and that will hurt about 50 drift net fishermen. Now the military are taking away my eel fishing, and next summer they are going to lay mines in our trawling water in Bra Bay. And they have put a stop to recreational fishing, too.

"They are trampling on us, and no one can say that they are doing anything to make our jobs and livelihood easier."

"Silly"

At the Fisheries Board in Sormland, Hans-Gunnar Andersson, a fisheries advisory officer, thinks it is sham democracy and completely silly to circulate a matter for comment when the military have been getting ready to lay mines since May of last year.

"The decision was made a long time ago," he says. "Of course, I realize that we must accept barriers and that the military are secretive. I firmly believe those who saw and reported submarines in the area, but I really feel that eel fykes and nets as well as recreational fishing could be allowed. Many islands in Orsbaken are used as nighttime harbors.

"The County Government Board and the military were able to reach an agreement on fishing in mined waters off Harnosand, and the same should be possible here. I feel that their decision is very unfavorable, both for professional fishermen and for people out for recreation," said Hans-Gunnar Andersson of the Fisheries Board.

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

COUNTRY'S MILITARY PLANNERS SHOULD FOCUS ON NORTH ATLANTIC

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 4 Apr 86 p 3

[Op Ed Article by Carl Bildt]

[Text] The strategic lightning rod no longer diverts all tension to Berlin, but to the Sea of Norway, instead. There is a greater opportunity in our region to exercise strategic pressure in an unclear situation. It is also necessary here to secure one's positions quickly before a possible expansion of a major-power conflict. This was written by Conservative Party security policy expert Carl Bildt in his analysis of the new situation in the North Atlantic.

It has become popular to discuss the danger of war.

The government claims that the danger of war has subsided, since the situation in Central Europe is so stable. With this, they hope to indicate that there is no reason to strengthen our defenses.

Just about 1 year ago it was common to talk about the dramatically increased threat of war. To some extent, the report from the Palme Commission set the tone in the debate. The foreword stated that the "danger of war is greater than it has been in many years."

In a short publication several years ago, Wilhelm Agrell attempted to create order in the debate over the danger of war. His conclusion was that the acute danger of war should not be exaggerated, but that the development of the "structural causes of war" was a cause of considerable concern. He pointed out that this was resulting in "greater difficulty in predicting when, in what situation, and in which forms a war could break out."

I believe that Wilhelm Agrell's analysis is still sound. There is no reason for concern in the short term, but in the longer term it will become more and more difficult to foresee the course of events. Any discussion of the danger of war in the future will be little more than gossip over coffee.

When the government describes our situation, it is often in terms of the situation in Central Europe. Like the Defense Committee, the government points to the deadlock that exists there today.

But it is hardly correct to state that what our defense planning is primarily aimed at is an attempt to utilize our country in connection with impending or ongoing battles elsewhere in our part of the world, primarily in Central Europe.

This was true at one time in the past. That was the perspective on Swedish security policy during the 1950's and 1960's. But it has less and less to do with the realities of the 1980's and 1990's.

The dramatic event that has occurred since the 1960's is that the strategic significance of the North Atlantic region has increased sharply and closer links have developed between this area and the North European region, of which Sweden is a part. The Defense Committee speaks repeatedly in its report about a continuous "North European and North Atlantic region." This is a new concept that reflects a new reality.

Thus, the perspective in our security policy has shifted from an older Central European perspective to a newer North Atlantic perspective.

The Defense Committee is thorough in its description of the basic differences between the Central European and the North Atlantic and North European regions, as well as the trends in the development of these regions. In Central Europe the situation is described as "deadlocked," but there are many references to "changes" in our region.

It seems unlikely that a war would break out like a bolt of lightning from the clear blue, by way of a massive Soviet attack in Central Europe. The nuclear deterrent is in effect there.

Rather, the danger of war lies in the risk of a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union somewhere in the outskirts of the enormous Eurasian land mass, such as in the "zone of instability" between the Bosphorus and the Indus River. It is difficult to predict the risk of such a confrontation between now and the year 2000, for example, but few are prepared to write off this danger entirely.

The risk of an immediate spread of such a conflict to North Europe is much greater than the danger of it's spreading to Central Europe. The strategic lightning rod no longer conducts all tension to Berlin, but rather to the Sea of Norway. In our region, there is a far greater chance of exerting strategic pressure in an uncertain situation. At the same time, it is necessary here to secure one's positions quickly in the face of a possible expansion of the conflict.

As a necessary precaution before a possible expansion of a conflict in some part of the world, both the United States and the Soviet Union will take steps that directly affect our region. These measures will cause a greater danger of rapid escalation to open warfare here than in other regions.

The Soviet Northern Fleet will try to establish itself rapidly in the North Atlantic. The Atlantic Fleet of the United States will try to establish itself rapidly in that same region. The former will move down toward the south. The latter will move up toward the north.

Air operations from land bases and aircraft carriers--including Soviet carriers during the 1990's--will be intense. Massive air reinforcements can reach the area within days.

It is becoming less and less likely that the Baltic Sea and its inlet and outlet regions will remain outside this strategic chess game.

Some of the planning for these crisis and prewar operations has been described by the United States in a document entitled "The Maritime Strategy," which was recently published and which Ola Tunander made extensive use of in his article (DAGENS NYHETER, Debatt, 20 Feb). The Soviet planning remains secret, but the combination of a clearly offensive doctrine and the type of exercises we have seen, for example, during the summer of 1985 give a clear indication.

In a certain situation during a crisis or prewar phase of this type, the danger of a lightning Soviet operation against NATO positions in Norway would be extremely high. It must come early and quickly in order to succeed. The realization that this danger exists will lead to extensive preventive measures by NATO. Sweden's situation will become extremely precarious at an early stage.

This newer North Atlantic perspective places greater and, to some extent, different demands on our security and defense policies than those made by the older Central European perspective.

In the past, we could think primarily in terms of war: wait until war broke out in Germany, order a full mobilization, and counter a major invasion. Now we must think more in terms of crises: follow every change carefully, make military and political contributions toward stability, and maintain the military capacity to deal with rapidly changing and unexpected situations.

Previously, it could perhaps be said that the ability to deal with major invasions across the Baltic Sea or Tornealv was enough and that everything else was less important. Now we must also be able to deal with darker, lighter, and rapidly shifting so-called gray-zone situations, realizing that "during crises, violations can draw us into more and more difficult situations and, ultimately, into war," as the Defense Committee recently stated.

To be sure, it can be difficult to understand these new strategic realities and the demands they present. There are also many ways to try to avoid this realization.

One way is to lock oneself into the old Central European perspective and, based on this perspective, to claim that the danger of war has been reduced.

Another way is advocated by SIDA (Swedish International Development Authority) chief Carl Tham in his DAGENS NYHETER article of 14 February, in which he indicated that we were "out of step with international developments" and the improved climate between Reagan and Gorbachev. But this was precisely what led to the confusion in Swedish security policy during the 1970's: the illusion that the dynamics of major strategic developments are affected by shifts in the political climate. We should have learned our lesson.

Strategic developments have their own dynamics, apart from political variations. The Defense Committee has stated that the trend toward an increase in the strategic significance of our region was "unequivocal apparently will continue during the foreseeable future." In addition, the Soviet author who goes under the pseudonym Kommissarov recently wrote that the strategic importance of our region had "increased sharply."

The contribution that our overall policy of neutrality can make to stability in the north is a function of both our foreign and our defense policies. The strength of the whole is determined by the strength of its parts. We learned this difficult lesson during the war years. From 1940 to 1942 our neutrality wavered because its military component was too weak.

The importance of our defenses in maintaining stability in Northern Europe has increased as the North Atlantic perspective has gained greater acceptance. At the same time, however, these defenses have become weaker.

This trend must now be reversed. If it is allowed to continue, Sweden is in danger of undergoing a gradual change from being a factor of stability to becoming a factor of instability in the more and more important North European and North Atlantic region. The consequences can be serious.

We are not in control of the danger of war in remote sections of the world and our possibilities for judging these risks far into the future are limited. But we will be realistic enough to realize that the overall strength of Swedish security policy can dampen the structurally increasing risk that an acute superpower crisis or a war could lead to open warfare in the north, as well.

A continued weakening of Swedish defenses will increase the risk to Sweden and the northern region. A stronger defense will reduce the danger.

The choice is ours.

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

ACUTE SHORTAGE OF AIR RAID SHELTER CAPACITY IN STOCKHOLM

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 Mar 86 p 12

[Article: "Acute Shortage of Air Raid Shelters in Stockholm"]

[Text] There is an acute shortage of air raid shelters in central Stockholm. In the event of war, there will be room for only 600,000 people. At least 580,000 more spaces are needed. In addition, in the event of a crisis, only certain sections of the subway may be used as shelter.

Many stations are below the level of Lake Malaren. People seeking shelter at T-centralen, Kungstradgarden, or Ostermalmstorg would be drowned if a bomb were to hit the protective gates, according to an article in the latest edition of AKTUELLT on the Civil Defense.

Leave Town

The shortage of air raid shelter capacity means that more Stockholmers than the desired number would have to leave the city. It would be impossible to carry out the Civil Defense plan for Stockholm, whereby only the elderly, children, and the ill would be evacuated and those in good health would remain, working jobs in production near the shelters.

The shortage of air raid shelters is in central Stockholm. There is more than enough room in suburbs such as Skarholmen, Vallingby, Farsta, Tensta, and Rinkeby.

There is a severe shortage in the downtown area, however. Shelter region 122-1 in Ostermalm and Vasastaden, for example, is 1,700 x 900 m. Space is needed for 37,794 persons, while there is room for only 871, according to AKTUELLT.

There are two reasons for the shortage of air raid shelter capacity in central Stockholm. One reason is that from 1950 to 1970 the authorities believed that terror bombing with nuclear weapons was the greatest threat. In that case, air raid shelters would be of no use. Only evacuation could help.

Now it is believed that war with conventional weapons is possible. As a result, from 1950 to 1970 no air raid shelters were built in 14 Swedish towns. During that same period, however, the entire downtown area of Stockholm was rebuilt.

Tunnels In Rock

Unfortunately, it is efficient to build shelters only during construction of the building. Constructing shelters afterward is much more expensive.

Now the Civil Defense intends to use evacuation, construct so-called protected areas, and use the subway system.

The best tunnels that are located above the level of Lake Malaren are found in Sodermalm. They are located in rock. The Hotoget, Radmansgatan, Odenplan, and St. Eriksplan stations are also sufficiently high, but they are not in rock.

"The problem is to get people down into the shelters during the 2 or 3 minutes we have after the air raid alarm sounds," said Roland Nilsson of the county government's defense unit.

"Many people work far away from the subway stations and, in addition, it will be extremely crowded in the entryways."

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

NAVY'S LONG-TERM BUDGET NEEDS TO STOP SUB INCURSIONS AIRED

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 30 Mar 86 p 8

[Commentary by Anders Ohman]

[Text] "God and the Navy we adore when danger threatens--not before."

This was stated by Queen Anne Stuart of England 300 years ago. These words were quoted by naval chief Bengt Schuback when he spoke before the Royal Society of Naval Sciences recently. The naval chief's loose translation was as follows:

"The danger is already here."

"It is time to increase our numbers."

The Navy is now at the center of the debate over the Defense Resolution of 1987. What numbers is the naval chief talking about, how strong does the commander in chief believe that the Navy should be, and what are the politicians thinking?

High quality, but too little of everything--this summarizes the Navy's view of itself today.

In 1985 the commander in chief reported 15 cases of foreign underwater activity along our coasts. This is the result of a thorough analysis of hundreds of reports.

It is these continuing intrusions to which Admiral Schuback refers when he speaks of the "danger."

Despite an intensified submarine hunt with all available resources, the Navy has been unable to stop the intrusions--much less force a foreign submarine up to the surface.

The naval chief points out that it is impossible to guard the 2,700-km Swedish coast with the approximately 50 vessels the Coastal Fleet now has. Sweden has the longest coastline of any Baltic Sea country.

In just over 20 years, the number of surface vessels and submarines has been reduced by one third and one half, respectively. These were the consequences for the Navy of the defense resolutions in the sixties and seventies.

These resolutions were made on a different--and more favorable for Sweden-- security policy background. The Defense Resolution of 1972 meant, in practice, that our entire capacity to hunt submarines was scrapped.

At the same time, possible attackers in the vicinity have sharply increased their naval forces. The reduced capacity of the Navy can be seen in the following table, which is taken from the plan entitled OB 85:

	1967	1987	Change
Surface vessels	57	34	-23
Submarines	24	12	-12
Minesweeping flotilla	14	8	- 6
Coastal artillery battalions	40	29	-11

New Force In 1990

The Navy is now hunting foreign submarines with an antisubmarine force that is being expanded and is expected to be complete around the year 1990. The latest addition includes vessels of the "Stockholm" coastal corvette type, which are expected to sharply increase the durability of the antisubmarine force and improve its ability to follow a submarine for a long period of time.

An antisubmarine force can consist of five coastal corvettes, five patrol boats, two or three submarines, two or three minesweepers, five or six heavy helicopters, and stationary surveillance systems for certain areas.

With regard to the Navy, the defense debate deals primarily with how many such antisubmarine forces it can have to stop the submarine intrusions. One force is too little. It can cover only one section of coast at a time and several foreign submarines appear simultaneously along the Swedish coast, according to the naval chief.

The Navy has related the number of antisubmarine forces to the various levels of allocations in the commander in chief's plan OB 85, which gives guidelines for the military during the coming 5 years.

The various levels in the OB 85 plan for the period 1987 to 1992 would provide the following amounts of money, in billions of kronor, to the Navy:

OB level	19.5
Plus level	18.4
PP level	17.6
Lowest level	17.3

According to Lennart Ljung, the OB level would provide a necessary restoration of the capacity of the Swedish military, considering the possible aggressors in the vicinity of Sweden. This would mean a 3-percent increase in defense appropriations.

Lowest Level

The PP level is the present program plan level, i.e. unaltered appropriations. The plus level is the highest level advocated by the politicians. The lowest level would mean a reduction in defense spending. The chiefs of all branches of service have expressed differing opinions on these levels to the commander in chief.

The Navy says that the OB level would provide two antisubmarine task forces by the year 1997 and three by the end of the century. The plus level would provide two antisubmarine forces by 1990 and the PP level would provide two task forces by 1999. The lowest level would result in two forces by the end of the century.

Naval chief Schuback is not satisfied with the rate at which these antisubmarine forces are being formed. He wants to see a more rapid rate.

Four antisubmarine task forces by the year 1997 and six by the year 2000 would satisfy him. He maintains that this more rapid expansion would benefit the entire Swedish invasion defense.

Losing Momentum

In order not to lose momentum, Bengt Schuback wants a decision to be made as early as 1987 on outfitting a second antisubmarine force.

The naval chief seems to have lost the first round in the defense policy debate, however. The Defense Committee recently decided to have the commander in chief study the consequences for the military of various spending levels, in hundreds of millions of kronor, above the present program planning level. The level advocated by the commander in chief himself was ruled out in this first round.

The naval chief immediately sharpened his tone and accused the Defense Committee of making contradictory statements.

He pointed out that pure indecision or uncertainty must not cause Sweden to wait until the second half of the nineties before it completes the formation of its next antisubmarine force. Measures against submarine intrusions cannot be reduced if we are to avoid a crisis in confidence both at home and abroad, according to Bengt Schuback.

Contradictory

The contradictory element in the Defense Committee's proposal is that it expresses a need to strengthen antisubmarine measures, while refusing to provide funding for the next antisubmarine force in the Defense Resolution of 1987.

"This means we will lose an unreasonable amount of time, perhaps up to 5 years. We cannot invest half-heartedly in something that is so important," said Bengt Schuback immediately after the Defense Committee issued its statement.

Now he is warning against additional delays of up to 8 years. He sees the OB level as an "absolute requirement."

A decision concerning the next antisubmarine force must be made in 1987, the naval chief repeated.

He is hardly expected to resign if the politicians do not do as he says. High-ranking officers seldom resign. Instead, they try to make the best of the money they receive. But the sharp words of the naval chief must not be ignored.

Counters Criticism

The Defense Committee chairman, undersecretary Per Borg, countered this criticism by stating that the committee had given antisubmarine defenses the same priority as the commander in chief. Borg understood the naval chief's vocal response to be a signal indicating that he had been promised too little money.

Per Borg also said that during the next round of the defense debate the commander in chief could reintroduce his own level of spending. The highest military leadership will discuss the Defense Committee's directives and their consequences in the near future.

The Navy's dilemma is not only a matter of ships and weapons. There is also a personnel shortage. Many highly trained technical specialists are leaving the Navy early. Spending for overtime pay has tripled since the beginning of the eighties.

Losing Heart

There is talk about ruthless exploitation of personnel. Helicopter pilots have lost heart and sought other jobs. Officers are expressing dissatisfaction.

The naval chief is calling for an additional 100 professional officers. The goal is to stop early retirement and increase the number of new recruits.

Will the creation of more antisubmarine forces--which cost the Swedish people billions of kronor to form--stop the submarine intrusions?

The military can give no guarantees on this point. In times of peace, no Western country has managed to force a submarine to the surface and to disarm it.

Our Duty

"In the future, it will continue to be our duty and our resolute intention to utilize all available means to maintain the territorial integrity of Sweden," according to the security policy section of the 1985-1986 budget proposal.

This security policy signal cannot be misunderstood. Now it is a question of how many billions the Swedish people and their elected representatives want to invest in antisubmarine measures.

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

600-PAGE REPORT DETAILS 'COMPUTER SOCIETY' VULNERABILITY

Given 'Secret' Classification

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 2 Apr 86 p 6

[Article by Willy Silberstein]

[Text] Computerized Sweden has become so sensitive that a government report on the vulnerability of a number of government agencies has had to be classified secret. If its contents are divulged, the country's security may be threatened, according to the National Police Board and the supreme commander of the Armed Forces [OB].

A year or so ago, the Swedish Agency for Administrative Development [STK] was instructed to survey security problems in the computer systems of government agencies.

The result is a hefty volume of approximately 600 pages. But because it has been classified secret, only personnel in the Ministry of Civil Service Affairs, the National Board of Economic Defense, the Ministry of Defense, the Office of the OB, the Institute of Defense Organization and Management, and the FOA [Defense Research Institute] will be allowed to read the report.

"We cannot release the report because of the Secrecy Law," says Mikael Franzen, head of division at the STK. "Not everything in the report is secret, but if we excluded certain information, it would be possible to see what we had skipped, and that would cause harm."

Among other things, the Secrecy Law says that secrecy applies to information which "is concerned with activity to protect the country or with planning or other preparations for such activity or which otherwise affects total defense, if it can be assumed that the country's defense will be harmed or that a danger to the country's security will be created in some other way if the information is disclosed."

But the STK is going to write an abridged version for publication so that government agencies can study some of what has been learned.

Experts not Surprised

The fact that government agencies are so vulnerable that the country's security would be harmed if information were published does not surprise experts involved in computer security.

That vulnerability results partly from the fact that computer systems have become so big. As an example, it can be mentioned that 1 out of every 4 kronor consumed in the private sector comes from the Social Security Administration's giant computer in the form of checks covering child allowances, pensions, and sickness benefits.

Rabbe Wrede was once a member of a government commission known as the Committee on Vulnerability, which concerned itself precisely with security questions. He says that many of the mishaps which occur in government agencies and in firms are hushed up and that the truth seldom comes out.

Harder To Find Malfunctions

"But I know there have been malfunctions in computer systems which have led government agencies to make decisions based on erroneous information. And it becomes even harder to find the errors when the computers of several agencies are interconnected—a situation that is quite common nowadays."

As an example, at one government agency, an intermediate header grew too long for a data list and had to be shortened to make room. After a few years, however, everyone had forgotten what it stood for, and the information was used in the wrong way.

There are also several examples from abroad of the vulnerability of computerized systems. In Italy, the entire Driver's License Registry was destroyed.

"One Italian I know had still not received his new driver's license after 2 years. I don't know whether the registry has been put together again yet," says Thomas Osvald, who was also a member of the Committee on Vulnerability.

Information Disappeared

Osvald has another illustration, this one from a Swedish law office, of how dangerous it can be to depend entirely on a computer system. The accounting data for the previous calendar year had been entered in a computer. The data disappeared. But the accounting records were also in reserve on a so-called backup. The only problem was that when the backup system was entered, that data also disappeared. Result: the accounting records for the entire year had to be posted all over again—a tremendous job.

"Putting it simply, one can say that it is not sensible to become as vulnerable as we have. In many places, people have grown so dependent on computers that the good old manual routines have been forgotten," says Nils Ryden, a department head at the Data Inspection Board.

If the post office computers break down, the employees can do their jobs with pencil and paper. But if a bank's computers go down, activity must stop, says Ryden.

Steps Must Be Taken

All experts agree that steps must be taken to reduce vulnerability. Rabbe Wrede says that one solution is for the heads of government agencies and firms to take greater responsibility for their data processing systems. They often know altogether too little about the matter.

Wrede says: "It may also be a good thing to lower our ambitions so that not so much is stored in computers."

Group To Study Remedies

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 3 Apr 86 p 8

[Article by Willy Silberstein]

[Text] An expert group is going to help firms and government agencies become less vulnerable to computer breakdowns. Bo Holmberg, minister of civil service affairs, will be responsible for the group, which will have Allan Eriksson as its chairman.

SVENSKA DAGBLADET reported on Wednesday that a report by the STK on the vulnerability of government agencies in the area of computers had been classified secret. The reason: if that report were circulated publicly, the country's security might be threatened.

Questions of vulnerability were studied for several years by the Committee on Vulnerability, which tried, among other things, to persuade firms and government agencies not to become too dependent on computer power. But that committee recently concluded its work.

Forming a Brain Trust

The activity will continue, but in a different form. Ministers Bo Holmberg, Sten Wickbom, Roine Carlsson, and Thage G. Petersson will set up a brain trust consisting of people deeply involved in the question of vulnerability in the field of computers.

Allan Eriksson has not been appointed chairman officially, but the Ministry of Justice confirms that he, along with 11 other persons, will pursue the matter of vulnerability.

Allan Eriksson describes the STK's classified report as a genuine terrorist's Bible.

"For anyone who is interested, it contains many tips on ways to wreak great havoc," he says.

Alternative Routines

According to Allan Eriksson, government agencies are often less interested than firms in reducing their vulnerability. The profit motive and daily dependence on the proper functioning of their activities have induced the firms to see to it that there are alternative routines in case the computers do not function.

"If a firm's production stops for a few hours or a full day, the results can be catastrophic for the firm. On the other hand, if the computer at the National Tax Board shuts down for a while, that fact is not noticed in the same way.

Easier To Achieve Results

"At the same time, it ought to be easier in one way to achieve results in the government agencies, because the government can issue directives.

"When we on the Committee on Vulnerability were looking at those questions, our minimum requirement was that agencies concerned with total defense should analyze their vulnerability and their disaster plans. And doing so will not cost much."

Allan Eriksson says that at any rate, awareness has increased among computer users. When the first government committee began pursuing questions of vulnerability in 1977, its activity was regarded as something almost exotic or frivolous. Many people now realize how big the problems are.

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ECONOMIC

FRANCE

PROBLEMS, PREPARATIONS SEEN FOR BANK PRIVATIZATIONS

Banks Looking for Capital

Paris LIBERATION in French 25 Apr 86 p 12

[Article by Claude Soula]

[Text] Privatization of the banks is well advanced. And it will probably be the most difficult of all the denationalizations. No matter what else can be said about it, a bank is not exactly a firm like the others. And despite their apparent good health, as shown by markedly higher profits this year--PARIBAS [Bank of Paris and the Low Countries] broke all records with a 52-percent increase in its profits--it has been seen that their problems are not just a matter of details.

Will the banks, including the "big three" nationalized after the war (the Lyons Credit Bank, the BNP [National Bank of Paris], and the General Company), be able to return to the private sector? Some of them were in distress in 1982, but have managed to regain health since then. The Vernes and Worms Banks, the European Banking Company, and the former Rothschild Bank are again showing a profit. But all the banks (except the Agricultural Credit Bank and, to a lesser extent, PARIBAS) are deficient in funds of their own--that is, money which they have been able to secrete from their profits and which is really their own. Although international standards of good management require that such funds total 5 percent of loans granted and the Bank of France requests a rate of 6 percent, French banks barely reach the 4-percent level.

Is that an abstract ratio? No, because the international credibility of the banks and the rates at which they are granted loans depend on it. The only two French banks rated "AAA"--the best possible rating--are the Agricultural Credit Bank and PARIBAS. The classification of the other banks would probably be worse than it is if they were in private hands: "They trust us because they know the French state stands behind us. Without that, our credibility would be very low," admits the chairman of one of the banks nationalized in 1982.

That criterion may not matter as much as people say. At least for one reason: privatization might well cure the banks of their chronic undercapitalization. "If the state privatizes us by issuing new shares, we are the ones who will

get the money. And that will strengthen us," says Michel Pebereau, head of the Commercial Credit Bank of France [CCF], which, along with PARIBAS and the Indosuez Bank, is among those heading the list of banks to be privatized.

But another possibility, and one that would not particularly favor the "solidity" of the banks, is that the state might simply sell its shares. Since the government would be counting on the proceeds to improve its budget, the hopes of Michel Pebereau and the other bankers might be disappointed.

The other obstacle to denationalization will be sales price. "The Suez Finance Company was appraised at 4 billion francs. The success of its latest issue of investment certificates proves that it could be sold for at least 15 billion francs. Peyrelevade has certainly pulled it off," comments one of his colleagues. The bidding is going up fast. When considered on the same basis as Suez, PARIBAS becomes almost unmarketable. And the General Company, which is the only one of the big three that can be easily privatized, would also cost in the neighborhood of 15 billion francs.

When placed end to end, all those sales threaten to dry up the French financial market. Fortunately, some bank chairmen have made the first move by transferring one-fourth of their capital (Suez and PARIBAS) to the public in the form of investment certificates, which are similar to nonvoting shares. It would take only a law converting those certificates into shares, and those banks would already be partially privatized. In the case of Suez, it is already known that the duo consisting of Jean-Marc Vernes (former managing director of the bank of the same name, which is now part of Suez) and Jack Frances (associated with Victory Insurance--controlled in part by Suez--and a former Suez stockholder) is in the running and has set up a sizable kitty.

The return to the private sector by PARIBAS and Suez seems natural. Pierre Moussa, former chairman of PARIBAS, recently described "the idea of a state-owned merchant bank" as ludicrous. He was not wrong. In the case of the other banks, everything depends on their structure and orientation. The CCF, for example, should be the first bank with branches to be privatized. Its chairman explains: "We have only 225 windows in France and 7,000 employees. There is no overstaffing, and we are leaders in home banking services." To that must be added the bank's past and the weight carried by its former chairman, Jean Leveque, who in 1982 championed the cause of the nationalized "small stockholders."

It now remains to be seen who will profit from that privatization. At a meeting in January which he had organized with his former stockholders, Jean Maxime Leveque appeared very concerned about the future of "people's capitalism," fearing that the entire operation would be carried out at a level beyond the reach of private individuals. For its part, Suez has just set up a wage fund in which the savings of employees will be directed toward the purchase of shares in their company.

Paris LIBERATION in French 25 Apr 86 pp 12-13

[Article by C. S.]

[Text] "Persuading our customers that we will have to bill them for services when we are announcing an exceptional rise in profits will be difficult. The current situation is completely abnormal." Jacques Mayoux, chairman of the General Company, might have smiled yesterday, though, as he announced that profits for his group were up by 41 percent. The group will pocket 1.3 billion francs this year, compared to "only" 927 million francs last year.

Mayoux remained calm, however, merely stressing from the start the "importance of such results to the stockholders, whoever they are." He then dwelt at length on all the abnormal costs which he said burdened a bank. He was referring not to service charges on such things as checking accounts--although he considers them "inevitable"--but to taxes and red tape. "The cost of a checking account is such that we cannot lend money at less than 7 percent. Unless we lower our breakeven point, which is what any industrial firm does."

Taxation is the prime culprit among those "irreducible" fixed expenses. "Special bank taxes cost us 1.2 billion francs. Without them, we could shave 2 points off the interest on loans." He fears that those costs will rise even more with the increase in compulsory reserves that must be deposited in the Bank of France, a measure he described as "going directly against the tide."

In his hunt for unnecessary expenses, he latched on to a new adversary: "red tape." "France is the only country in the world where a bank must provide the central bank with a file on every loan granted." Estimated cost of those overly finicky rules: 300 million francs for the General Company alone. The bad habits attributed to customers are therefore not the only ones weighing on the bank's operating accounts. Jacques Mayoux seemed clearly less anxious to make his customers pay than the state.

That reflects a very independent attitude toward the entity which is still--and will remain for a long time to come--his chief stockholder and boss. At present, 17 percent of the capital is in the public's hands in the form of investment certificates. By the end of the year, one-fourth of the capital will have been transferred. Selling the rest will not be as easy. Despite his bank's good results, it still needs another 11 billion francs in its own capital to satisfy the criteria for good equilibrium.

BNP To Issue Certificates

Paris LIBERATION in French 25 Apr 86 p 13

[Article by Thierry Philippon]

[Text] The BNP, the first of the French banking monoliths, is getting in line for its turn at privatization. The bank announced yesterday that it was going

to issue investment certificates totaling 3.88 billion francs. The BNP is not really innovating when it issues nonvoting shares, since PARIBAS, Suez, and the General Company did so first. But it is nevertheless setting a double precedent.

This is the first time since the change of government that a state-owned enterprise has gone to the financial market. After thinking it over for a few weeks, Edouard Balladur's staff has therefore given its approval. At the same time, it is providing some information on how the denationalizations will take place. The certificates being offered by the BNP are the first not to offer the bearer a preference dividend as compensation for not being allowed to vote. Since the bank is not being very generous to its subscribers, it can be supposed that these certificates will change their spots within a few months and become genuine shares.

On the other hand, the BNP does not seem to be first on the list of companies to be privatized as a matter of urgency. Balladur is playing the role of a responsible and pragmatic minister. One cannot do everything at once, but the banks which need to strengthen their capital can begin preparing for limited nationalization [as published]. Some institutions such as the Lyons Credit Bank, which have also prepared "privatization certificates," may soon bring them out of the "oven."

The BNP does not seem to be making a bad deal. The 8 million certificates are being offered at a price of 485 francs, and that compares to a profit per share of 46.80 francs in 1985. That is a rather reasonable value, and it should enable the bank to sell them through its network without too much difficulty on the strength of an unanswerable argument: "Our capital is of interest to you." Customers who will soon have to start paying for a number of services, notably the expense of maintaining an account, can always recoup some of their cost in the form of dividends.

The reason is that the BNP, which is the seventh-largest bank in the world, is still doing rather well. Its chairman, Rene Thomas, showed satisfaction as he presented the accounts. Net earnings from banking activity rose by a modest 4.9 percent last year to 27.6 billion francs, but the consolidated results for the BNP and its subsidiaries (before taxes and reserves) are up by 7.8 percent. And the group's net earnings after taxes really exploded, rising by 21.6 percent to 7.99 billion francs.

On the other hand, the balance sheet shows a surprising drop in reserves for bad debts and other risks (5.2 percent). The fact is that the BNP appears to be the most vulnerable of all French banks to the dangers of a suspension of payment by certain debtors in the Third World. In any event, the supervising minister, Edouard Balladur, will have no reason to complain about bank accounts.

Nor will the employees, because Rene Thomas is going to show particularly fine style in the matter of participation. The chairman of the BNP, who is getting ready to place 15.8 percent of the bank's capital in the hands of the public, has not forgotten his personnel: a maximum of 10 percent of the investment

certificates will be set aside for employees. This is the first life-size implementation of participation and "people's shareholding."

Indosuez Bank's Sour Note

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Paris LIBERATION in French 25 Apr 86 p 13

[Article by T. Ph.]

[Text] It has become a tradition: political alternation at the pinnacles of the state generally produces very fine balance sheets in public-sector enterprises. The results presented yesterday by the Indosuez Bank therefore strike a somewhat sour note in a very uniform chorus of banks. The chairman of Indosuez, Jean Peyrelevade, was definitely unlucky last year. Events piled up one after the other, and he probably was unable to present the results he would have liked. He himself admitted that "the results were somewhat disappointing overall."

But his bank did not do badly in France and Europe, where overall results were better by 50 percent. Despite increasingly keen competition in the financial markets (bonds, treasury bills, and so on), the Indosuez Bank increased its market share in France. It also continued to recenter its activity on Europe by establishing a subsidiary in Norway and a branch in Turkey. Lastly, the bank bought a minority interest in a German establishment.

The only trouble was that it got somewhat burned by the decline of the dollar, with the result that overall, the bank's consolidated profit rose by only 11 percent to 625.5 million francs. In addition, the Indosuez Bank's historical bastions in Asia and the Middle East experienced difficulties. In Saudi Arabia, its subsidiary's results were down by 40 percent. Profits by the Al Saudi Bank, which contributed 25 percent of the overall results in 1984, dropped to 5 percent last year. The drop in petroleum prices is causing petrodollars and banking activity to melt away. Competition is also tough in Asia. Indosuez suffered from the recession in Indonesia, and its rather successful establishment in Japan remains to be confirmed. Lastly, it is not likely that the subsidiary opened in Nepal last year is going to produce quick results.

The result is that 1986 will be a year of consolidation. The chairman indicated that the first quarter had been "good." But Indosuez will have to swallow the Vernes Bank by accepting 90 percent of the capital from its parent group, the Suez Finance Company. In view of those problems, Jean Peyrelevade did not do so badly, and the effect of his activity as head of the Indosuez Bank remains favorable. It remains to be seen whether that will be enough to enable him to keep his job in upcoming months.

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ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

HOPES FOR 'BRIDGE' DASHED--In a hot climate like Luanda, a cold shower has just been the lot for those poor souls that were convinced that one of the advantages of Portuguese membership in the EEC would turn us into a "bridge" between the European Community and the Lusophone African countries. The summit that just took place in Angola took care to remind us that each of the five countries present [Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe] deals directly with the EEC and does not need in the least Lisbon's good offices in this regard. This is one more illusion that our "Europeanists" are losing, if they had it at all at one time or another. [Text] [Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 6 May 86 p 20] /12858

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ECONOMIC

TURKEY

BRIEFS

WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX--The State Statistics Institute has announced that the wholesale price index increased by 2 percent in April, 28.7 percent during the past 12 months, and 10.2 percent during the first 4 months of the year. The wholesale price index increased by 10 percent in the agricultural, manufacturing, and energy sectors during the first 4 months of the year, while it decreased by 7.5 percent in the mining sector as a result of the drop in crude oil prices. [Text] [Ankara Domestic Service in Turkish 1800 GMT 10 May 86] /9604

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